The
military situation in the Ottoman Empire, which had deteriorated throughout
1918, received a severe setback when Turkish forces in Palestine were routed by
General Allenby in the Battle of Megiddo commencing on 19 September. The
situation on all fronts, which was dire enough anyway, was grievously
exacerbated when the Bulgarians, clearly seeing the way events were proceeding,
raised a flag of truce on 27 September and concluded an armistice three days
later thus exposing the Turks’ northern flank to the victorious Allied forces
in the Balkans. It therefore seemed evident that Turkey’s days as an active
combatant were numbered yet when the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir
Henry Wilson, sensibly asked the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, what the
Foreign Office would do if Turkey also sued for peace, Balfour did not know.
Wilson took the opportunity so provided by Balfour’s hesitancy to ‘put in a
strong plea for making love to Turkey, not to Bulgaria.’
The Bulgarian cease-fire took effect from noon on 30 September; at the following
day’s Cabinet in London Wilson explained the military situation in Bulgaria,
making particular reference to the fact that, if the Bulgarian army were
disarmed and demobilized the country ‘would be at the mercy of the
Austrians’ and this would prevent an Allied march on Constantinople (‘as
Prime Minister wants’) for some time. That afternoon, Wilson motored down to
Hassocks to see Lloyd George, who was recuperating from an illness; also there
was the First Sea Lord, Admiral Wemyss, and, amongst others, the ubiquitous
Hankey. ‘The whole talk’, Wemyss subsequently informed the First Lord,
‘was of course, on the Bulgarian situation…The problem which is now facing
us is — will Turkey follow in the footsteps of Bulgaria, and if so, what will
be the Naval situation.’
Wemyss concluded that, in such circumstances, there would be nothing to
stop the Allied squadrons parading up the Dardanelles, although he had cause to
wonder what they would encounter in the Sea of Marmora — which depended very
much on the state of the Turkish fleet. The more immediate problem however was
the galling prospect of this grand parade of allied ships being led by a French
admiral! This so concerned Wemyss that he telegraphed Admiral Gough-Calthorpe,
the Mediterranean C-in-C, with orders ‘to be ready to leave Malta at the very
shortest notice to proceed and hoist his flag in a battleship in the Aegean if
it is thought necessary to do so.’ Ironically, the old dreadnought Superb
– precisely the type of ship Gough-Calthorpe had been requesting in February
after Goeben made her forlorn sortie into the Aegean
– was sent out to reinforce Lord Nelson
and Agamemnon, not against the threat from the Turks but from the
French. ‘We shall then have three English battleships out there’, Wemyss
confidently declared, ‘which will alter the balance somewhat considerably,
especially since I hear…that the state of the French ships at Mudros is
anything but satisfactory, and that the French Admiral knows it.’
Following the Bulgarian capitulation, the position of Enver and Talaat
was made untenable and the Turkish Cabinet resigned on 8 October. By this time
indications had already reached the Foreign Office from Berne of a desire by the
Turks to engage in peace negotiations; however, Lord Robert Cecil (temporarily
standing in for Balfour, who was ill) concurred with the appraisal from
Switzerland which doubted the sincerity of the latest peace feelers. These,
Cecil informed Lloyd George, were designed
with
the object of playing the game [the Turks] have played so successfully for the
last 50 years of procrastination trusting that they will be saved by Western
powers ultimately quarrelling among themselves as has always been the case in
the past. We are not in a position militarily to destroy rapidly Turkish armed
forces and the only way therefore to disarm Turkey quickly is by an armistice.
Delays will enable the Germanophil Turks to improve the Defences of the
Dardanelles and Bosphorus and perhaps get German troops to take them over…
Although
Cecil’s prescience would shortly be confirmed when the anticipated quarrels
amongst the victors did eventuate, his proselytizing activities were somewhat
wasted on Lloyd George as the Prime Minister was determined upon a swift Allied
advance against Constantinople. In this desire he was joined by the French
Premier, Clemenceau, (‘He wants to hit Turkey as soon as possible’) whereas
the respective military advisers either advocated caution (Wilson) or were
entirely opposed to the idea (Foch).
Lloyd George, now recovered, travelled to Versailles on 4 October to
discuss the general situation with Clemenceau and the Italian Prime Minister,
Vittorio Orlando. The French put forward the ‘most fantastic proposals’,
promising to isolate Turkey by occupying Bulgaria and using submarines to gain
control of the Black Sea. In contrast, Wilson’s advice to Lloyd George was
straightforward: ‘Occupation of as much of Serbia as we could; occupation of
the least of Bulgaria we could; occupation of Maritza line…and then an attack
on Constantinople and Gallipoli with Greek and British troops.’ The British
delegation – Lloyd George, Hankey, Wilson and Admiral Hope – put forward a
united front, at which Clemenceau, applying the old adage of divide and conquer,
suggested a private meeting between the three Premiers. After half an hour of
this, Wilson was summoned into the secret conclave only to find, to his horror,
that the three statesmen were ‘discussing Balkan strategy on a small
hand-atlas map of Europe, the whole page of Europe being about 8 inches by 6
inches! And this after four years of war.’ Wilson sensibly suggested that the
meeting be opened up to include the military advisers; later that afternoon the
three Premiers were joined by Wilson, Foch and Admirals Hope and Le Bon to argue
over Lloyd George’s proposal to transfer troops (with Allenby at their head)
from Palestine to European Turkey with a view to knocking the Turks out as soon
as possible. Although nothing was settled at this meeting, Lloyd George believed
that he had made his point so strongly that he authorized Wilson to wire Allenby
regarding the transfer of troops. Then, the following day, news was received by
telephone from the Admiralty that a Turkish envoy was on his way to Athens to
discuss peace terms.
At the subsequent meeting on 7 October the French plan to employ a French
general for the attack on Turkey came to light and promptly ran into a solid
wall of opposition from Lloyd George. In a hasty alteration, and only ‘after
much wrangling’, it was agreed that the British General, Sir George Milne,
should command operations against Turkey; the order to Allenby was cancelled .
The question of the naval command, which had so exercised the First Sea Lord’s
mind, now assumed vital importance as the last flames of Turkish resistance
flickered. Wemyss continued his campaign for a British admiral to assume
control: in a closely argued memorandum of 12 October the First Sea Lord
asserted that the forces at the disposal of the Allies in the Mediterranean were
sufficient to cope with the situation but that political considerations had made
it ‘impossible to come to a satisfactory understanding with our allies.’
Although forced to admit that the French Admiral, Gauchet, was
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean forces (excluding the Adriatic) Wemyss
nevertheless contended that the Aegean was, and always had been, a British zone.
This situation had been altered temporarily when, earlier in 1918, the French
had dispatched six pre-dreadnoughts to reinforce Lemnos, under the command of a
Vice-Admiral; now, the situation had changed again. ‘The operations which are
about to be put into force against the Turks’, Wemyss argued, ‘require close
Naval co-operation, and this co-operation may be divided into two parts…
(1)
The landing of troops and stores, etc., at subsidiary bases between Salonika and
Gallipoli, and the protection thereof. (2) The eventual passage of the Fleet
through the Dardanelles into the Marmora, the occupation of Constantinople, and
eventually defeating the Black Sea Fleet. As regards (1) there is no question
but that it will be in British hands. Not only are our Allies pleased that all
the spade work should be done by us, but the only forces there capable of doing
the work are British.
Despite
this special pleading, the first attempt by the Allies to resolve the question
ended in failure; indeed the problem was exacerbated following a conference of
naval representatives which had been held at Versailles on 10 October
specifically to settle the issue of liaison between the land and naval forces
which were set to advance on Constantinople. Admiral Hope, the British
representative (acting on instructions from Wemyss) proposed that the direction
of all operations should be under a British Admiral who would act generally
under the command of the French C-in-C. Although supported by the Italian
representative, the suggestion was firmly quashed by the French.
Wemyss thereupon set out the ‘several reasons both practical and
sentimental why the command of these Allied forces should be in British
hands.’ These included the emotive appeal that it had been Great Britain which
had made the ‘greatest sacrifices and undertook the greatest responsibility’
of the 1915 Gallipoli operations, and that command for these bungled operations
(not, of course, that Wemyss expressed himself so) had rested with a British
Admiral. Also, as the Allied land forces advancing on Turkey were commanded by a
British General, Wemyss argued that ‘To ensure the closest co-operation it is
essential that the General and Admiral in command should be of the same
nationality. To entrust the control ashore and afloat to Officers of different
nations is to place an obstacle in the way of success.’ The First Sea Lord
then resorted to the first refuge of the scoundrel — statistics! — by
showing that the majority of the vessels in the Aegean, including all the
dreadnoughts, were British. As the Aegean had always been a British zone
throughout the war Wemyss could not see what arguments could possibly be brought
forward ‘in support of a change in this system which has worked well in the
past.’
All this was very reasonable in its way; then, however, Wemyss got to the
crux of the matter: ‘If the command at sea in these waters were put into the
hands of an Admiral of any nationality other than British, it would be possible
for an uninstructed public to say that the Gallipoli operations of 1915 having
failed under British command, it had been found necessary to entrust the duty to
another nation.’
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, agreed fully with
Wemyss and added the further point that, after Britain had gained command of the
Black Sea, it was exceedingly likely ‘that we may wish to pass troops through
and send one or more Expeditionary Forces to Constanza or Odessa or Sebastopol
to gain touch with the Roumanians and the friendly South Russians, or to Poti or
Batoum or Trebizond to move into the Caucasus or on to the Caspian and to hold
out a hand to the Czechs.’
Lloyd George used the memorandum by Wemyss as the basis for an appeal
directed to Clemenceau. While accepting the First Sea Lord’s arguments, the
Prime Minister could not put them to the French in the strident tones used by
Wemyss; nevertheless, although watered down, the cumulative effect of the
arguments employed was still, as far as the British were concerned, compelling.
We
have taken [Lloyd George reminded Clemenceau] by far the larger part of the
burden of the war against Turkey in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, in Egypt, in
Mesopotamia and in Palestine. The British Government has agreed that the C-in-C
of the Allied Armies in France should be a French General; it has been agreed
that the C-in-C of the Allied Armies in the Balkans should be a French General.
I do not see how I could possibly justify to the people of the British Empire
that at the moment when the final attack upon Turkey was to be delivered, the
command of the Naval Forces which are overwhelmingly British, in a theatre of
war associated with some of the most desperate and heroic fighting by troops
from nearly every part of the British Empire, should be handed over to a French
Admiral as well. I feel sure that you will agree with me in thinking that no
French Government could consent to entrust the command of their forces in
similar circumstances to a non-French Admiral and I am confident that you will
agree that the command…should be entrusted to a British Admiral acting under
the general command of the French C-in-C in the Mediterranean.
The
Prime Minister’s secretary, Philip Kerr, sent the appeal to the British
Ambassador in Paris, Lord Derby, where it was received on the morning of 18
October. Derby immediately went to see Clemenceau who was just about to leave
for the Front
and had, therefore, time only for a cursory look at the letter; even so, Derby
reported later that day that he ‘did not take it very well.’ Clemenceau fell
back on the same line of argument employed by Lloyd George — that it would be
difficult to explain to the French public, and, in any event, could not commit
himself until his Cabinet had met to consider the issue, which would not be
until 22 October. It was Derby’s personal opinion that the initial response
would be unfavourable, due to violent opposition from the Ministry of Marine and
other factions within the Government, but that Clemenceau, who was personally in
favour, would be able to swing the argument around, especially if it meant that
the Italians could be forced into line and made to put their fleet under the
control of the French Admiralissimo.
Before the French Cabinet could meet, a new Turkish Ministry was formed
with the specific intention of suing for peace. Following Talaat’s hasty
departure
General Izzet Pasha assumed the onerous mantle of Grand Vizier after no other
candidate was found willing to accept the burdensome task. As an immediate
indication of their good intentions (but, it should be added, at the British
General’s own urging) the Turks gave General Townshend, who had been captured
in 1916 after botching the Mesopotamian campaign, his liberty. Townshend had
himself approached Izzet on 17 October with a request that he should be allowed
to act as a go-between. ‘I flattered myself’, Townshend recorded in his
apologia, ‘that they would have confidence in my ability to conduct such a
mission and would have equal confidence in the genuineness of my endeavour to
obtain honourable terms for their country.’
Townshend arrived at Mudros at three o’clock on the morning of 20
October with a Turkish plenipotentiary; after some initial difficulty in
attracting attention, news of the General’s arrival promptly became common
knowledge and word soon spread that the Turks would ‘take any terms short of
absolute surrender.’ To guarantee this, according to the rumour, they were
prepared to ‘massacre all the Germans and open the Dardanelles…’
Townshend soon briefed Gough-Calthorpe on the situation, making particular
mention of his belief that the Turks were anxious to commence peace
negotiations, so long as they dealt only
with the British. Evidently the new Government at the Porte believed it could
extract more favourable terms from the British than would be forthcoming from
the French. Townshend’s message was quickly considered in London, and just as
quickly dismissed: Gough-Calthorpe was informed by Wemyss on 21 October that the
British Government would be prepared to consider terms of peace in due course
but that nothing could be arranged without consultation with the Allies which
would, clearly, take time. In the interim however, negotiations for an armistice
could be discussed without delay; but these discussions, Wemyss declared, would
have to be concluded promptly ‘if Turkey is to escape further military
disasters and to have the benefit of British assistance in throwing off the
German yoke.’
Meanwhile,
Clemenceau had been busy. Despite his assurance to Derby that no answer would be
forth-coming before the 22nd, Clemenceau had in fact spent part of his time away
from Paris in concocting a complete rebuttal of Lloyd George’s arguments. This
was handed to Derby at 7.40 on the evening of the 21st; the Ambassador was so
thoroughly taken aback by the French response that he sent the rebuttal
immediately to Lloyd George en clair,
with a covering note that it was, in Derby’s opinion, ‘a disagreeably worded
document’ which ended in a blank refusal.
Clemenceau had attempted to answer Lloyd George point for point: thus, with
regard to the preponderance of British warships in the Aegean, Clemenceau
contended that ‘superiority of numbers has never been the determining factor
of selection to command between the Allied Powers.’ And, although it was true
that Mudros, from where command had been exercised in the Aegean throughout the
war, was a British base it was still understood (by the French at least) that
the general direction of operations in the Mediterranean had been under French
supervision since the signing of the Anglo-French Naval Convention in London in
August 1914. Clemenceau even saw fit to snub ‘the greater part of the burden
of the war’ borne by the British in Gallipoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and
Palestine whose effect, he asserted undiplomatically, was first ‘to weaken
your admirable effort on the Western front, and secondly, to leave us the major
part of the campaign in Macedonia to carry on.’ Finally, Clemenceau declared,
arguing from baser motives, France was Turkey’s principal creditor.
Although Derby cautioned Lloyd George against taking immediate action – as he
had just heard a rumour that the Germans were on the point of accepting the
Armistice terms laid down by President Wilson – he suspected that the letter
was evidence of the French assuming ‘a very disagreeable attitude’ with
regard to the British position in the East.
On the day following this unseemly altercation (22 October) Gough-Calthorpe
was informed by the Admiralty that, ever since the initial Turkish approach
earlier that month, it had been agreed by Britain, France and Italy that
‘while terms of peace would need long consideration an armistice might be
concluded by any of the 3 Powers to which the Turkish Government might make
advances on the following conditions.’ The C-in-C was sent a list of the
conditions, arranged in order of importance; however the first four were deemed
‘of such paramount importance and if completely carried out will so inevitably
make us master of the situation, that we do not wish you to jeopardize obtaining
them, and obtaining them quickly by insisting unduly on all or any of the rest,
or indeed by raising any particular one of the remaining 20 if you think it
might endanger your success in getting the vital 4 at once.’
The “vital 4” conditions were held to be the following:
1.
Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and secure access to the Black Sea.
Allied occupation of the Dardanelles forts and Bosphorus forts.
2.
Position of all minefields, torpedo tubes and other obstructions in
Turkish waters, to be indicated, and assistance given to sweep or remove them as
may be required.
3.
All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be
communicated.
4.
All Allied prisoners-of-war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners
to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.
On
the evening of the 22nd Clemenceau protested ‘against our making an armistice
with the Turks simply on the basis of their handing over the Bosporus and giving
us direct access to the Black Sea’. As a result Lloyd George planned to send
Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for War, to Paris the following day to
soothe ‘the old Tiger’ and also to try to persuade him that a British
Admiral should assume command.
As it was becoming clear that the Turks would only deal with the British,
Lloyd George subjected Clemenceau to one final blast on the 25th in a concerted
onslaught with Milner who had arrived in the French capital the previous day.
The delicate, if essential, wartime alliance was in danger of falling apart just
as peace seemed in the offing: ‘I must insist’, the British Prime Minister
unequivocally declared to his French colleague, ‘that the proposal we are now
making is not to transfer to a British naval commander a command which has
hitherto been in the hands of a French Admiral, but that the arrangement whereby
a British Admiral is in command of all operations in the Aegean, subject to the
control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, should continue
in force for the forthcoming Allied attack on Constantinople.’ Clemenceau’s
swipe at the British effort against Turkey, which he blamed for France having to
carry the lion’s share of the Macedonian campaign, also clearly struck a
responsive chord with the Prime Minister who felt ‘entitled to point out’
that the successes in the Balkans ‘have been due to British, to Italian, to
Serbian and to Greek efforts in quite as great a degree as to the efforts of the
gallant French troops on that front.’ Lloyd George categorically denied any
British intention ‘to exercise a preponderant or dominating influence at
Constantinople’ and implicitly recognized ‘to the full the special interests
which France possesses in Turkey…’; indeed he went so far as to guarantee to
Clemenceau that, ‘If it becomes necessary to occupy or overawe Constantinople,
the forces which will accomplish this will fly the flag of France both on land
and by sea.’
That Lloyd George could make such a sweeping pledge probably owed more to the
fact that he was aware that there would be no need to ‘overawe’
Constantinople, and that the Anglo-Turkish armistice talks would shortly
commence. Clemenceau’s carefully prepared position was promptly undermined by
his own naval representative, Admiral de Bon, who confessed to the Deputy First
Sea Lord that he had ‘not the smallest desire that Admiral Gauchet should take
over S[enior] N[aval] O[fficer] Aegean from Admiral Calthorpe.’ De Bon
suggested a sensible compromise to overcome the question of protocol at the
Dardanelles: allow Calthorpe, with his squadron of four ships, to lead the
procession through the Straits, while Admiral Amet, the French Admiral in the
Aegean, would follow with his four ships.
Both this arrangement and the Lloyd George-Clemenceau tiff were rapidly
in danger of being overcome by events. Precisely 24 hours after de Bon’s
suggestion was made, the Turkish delegates arrived in Mudros aboard the British
cruiser Liverpool. The Turkish party
consisted of Raouf Bey, the Minister of Marine,
Reshad Hikmet Bey, a Foreign Office official, and Lieutenant-Colonel Saadullah
Bey, the Military Member, accompanied by three Staff officers and two orderlies.
Gough-Calthorpe received the delegation aboard Agamemnon,
whence he had transferred his flag as that particular ship offered the best
facilities for the purposes of a conference; the Turks were also accommodated
aboard the ship. However, the desire of all to proceed with dispatch was
forestalled for the simplest of reasons — some of the Turks had been seasick
on the journey. It was bad enough to commit one’s country to the unknown; that
punishment would have been severe enough without having had to negotiate their
unhappy fate while also suffering from mal
de mer.
Negotiations thereupon commenced with the British at 9 o’clock the following
morning, Sunday 27 October, allowing the Turks one night’s sleep, which may,
or may not have been, restful. It was by no means plain sailing though, as it
soon became obvious that the Turks entertained the gravest reservations over
clause one of the British conditions. If this were not bad enough, some five
hours after the talks had commenced the French representative at Mudros, Admiral
Amet, informed Gough-Calthorpe that he (Amet) had just received a wireless
message from Gauchet, the French C-in-C, instructing him to act as a negotiator
in conjunction with Gough-Calthorpe and to accept no conditions without first
referring to the French Admiralty. Gough-Calthorpe replied that he personally
had been authorized by his Government to arrange the terms of an Armistice and,
more importantly, the Turkish delegates were accredited to deal solely with the
British; to prove this Gough-Calthorpe helpfully showed Amet the Turks’
credentials, which had been signed by the Grand Vizier, and which clearly
indicated that the talks were to be confined to the British.
Gough-Calthorpe made clear his own opinion to the Admiralty late the
following night when he suggested that if Amet were permitted to join in the
negotiations ‘it would create difficulty and set back the prospect of
armistice.’ That prospect however was in danger of receding in any event, due
to continued Turkish intransigence over clause one — the opening of the
Straits and the Allied occupation of the forts. In particular, it was the
prospect of the forts being occupied by Greeks or Italians which so upset the
Turkish negotiators who then attempted to call Gough-Calthorpe’s bluff by
maintaining that they could not agree to an occupation of the forts without
reference to their own Government. The Admiral responded by threatening to break
off the negotiations while at the same time secretly urging London ‘to allow
me to modify first clause so that occupation of forts will be carried out by
British and French troops only.’
The talks continued until 7 o’clock that evening, though there was little
Gough-Calthorpe could do as he waited for an answer from London. When this
arrived on the 28th, he was authorized to give an assurance that only British
and French troops would be used but that, nevertheless, the actual form of
clause one should remain unaltered unless this should lead to the talks breaking
up.
Following the receipt of this message, which was ‘welcome’ to Gough-Calthorpe
and ‘appreciated’ by the Turks, the talks continued on the 28th from 3 p.m.
till 8 p.m., to allow time for a reply to arrive from Constantinople regarding
the first clause. Although this was not received that day, the majority of the
clauses had already been accepted, with the Turks requiring certain concessions
only on those points which they ‘regarded as oppressive or indicative of
something more than a desire for strategic security.’
This still left clause one however — the main point of contention between the
negotiators and the last hurdle before an armistice could be agreed. The Turkish
delegates earnestly requested that ‘a very small number of Turkish soldiers
may remain when forts are occupied as concession to honour of Turkey and as
indication of goodwill of Allies.’ This, it was claimed, would go far to
remove the humiliation that was bound to follow the occupation. And second, if
it could be avoided, no Greek warship should proceed to Constantinople or Smyrna
— ‘This for sake of peace of country and to avoid possible bloodshed.’ If
considered necessary that a Greek destroyer should
participate in the planned Black Sea operations the Turks could arrange for the
vessel to pass through the Bosphorus at night.
Despite this willingness to allow reasonable concessions, the Chief of the Naval
Staff unhelpfully telegraphed Gough-Calthorpe on the 30th, ‘I hope you will be
able to arrange for a Greek ship or ships to go up to Constantinople with you.
Such arrangements should be made on the spot without referring to Admiralty.’
If this did not give Gough-Calthorpe enough to worry about, there was
still the delicate problem with the French. However, by 30 October, Gough-Calthorpe
believed he had found a way round the dilemma, and one over which the French
could not argue: ‘With regard to question of Allied command in the Sea of
Marmora and the entrance,’ the C-in-C assuredly declared, ‘it is observed
that these are not geographically part of Mediterranean and that this
arrangement might be of use to Admiralty should any difficulty arise as to the
Allied command in this zone for the fact that Admiral Gauchet is Allied C-in-C
Medt in no way gives him authority as Allied C-in-C in entrance to or sea of
Marmora any more than it does in the Red Sea.’
As the French were showing signs of giving way on the question of command, the
Admiralty had no desire to become embroiled in a battle over disputed zones:
‘It appears to me’, the Chief of the Naval Staff wired Gough-Calthorpe,
‘so long as Admiral Gauchet is not on the spot you have everything that we can
desire.’ Furthermore, while he continued to be Senior Naval Officer in the
Aegean (as he outranked Admiral Amet), Gough-Calthorpe was politely requested to
refrain from referring to the Admiralty on the question of zones as the subject
was a ‘ticklish’ one and, with the French about to concede, ‘it would be
unwise to press the subject so long as the actual command is in your hands which
it is now and apparently must remain so as long as Admiral Gauchet is not in
company with you.’
It was essential therefore for Gough-Calthorpe to conclude the armistice
negotiations before the French Admiralissimo could arrive on the scene. But the
plans of mere mortal men were immediately upset as a natural phenomenon – in
the form of a violent gale which interrupted telegraphic communications between Agamemnon
and Constantinople – intervened to delay the proceedings. ‘Turkish
wireless’, Gough-Calthorpe fumed, ‘has proved wholly ineffective.’
Finally, the necessary reply was received from the Grand Vizier and Gough-Calthorpe
confidently expected to sign an agreement on the evening of 30 October. At
dinner that night, when it was realized that, following the respective
authorizations from London and Constantinople, the Armistice could at last be
signed the British and Turkish negotiators rose from the table, shaking hands,
after which drinks were served while the Captain’s coxswain of Agamemnon
‘cleared the small round table in the after cabin as they wanted to sign on
that.’ Understandably, the Turks were highly emotional and Raouf in particular
made a point of declaring that Turkey should never have gone to war with Britain
as ‘we had always been great allies.’
After midnight, Gough-Calthorpe was able to wire London that the terms had been
agreed, and the armistice would take effect from noon, local time, on Thursday
31 October 1918.
No sooner had the deed been done then Gough-Calthorpe received ‘a
somewhat intemperate telegram’ from Gauchet complaining that Admiral Amet had
been excluded from the Armistice negotiations in spite of a request that he
should be present. Gough-Calthorpe replied officially to Gauchet that he had
taken the course indicated by his perception of his duty and that it was a
matter of the deepest regret to him that Gauchet should have considered it to be
incorrect. Privately though, Gough-Calthorpe informed the Admiralty that, had
Amet been admitted as a party to the negotiations, ‘he himself told me that
decisions on every point would have to be transmitted to Paris for approval.’
Unsurprisingly, the Admiralty backed Calthorpe to the hilt.
But events rarely seemed to run to a predetermined course where the Ottoman
Empire was concerned for, although the man on the spot appeared to have achieved
his task simply and efficiently, the issue was not yet cut and dried. A
sub-committee of the War Cabinet met in London on the evening of 31 October,
some hours after the armistice had come into force, to consider the events of
the previous days. The committee’s somewhat perverse conclusion was promptly
delivered to Lloyd George and Balfour: the members were ‘very much averse to
permitting any Turkish soldiers to remain in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles
forts. Such a concession is no doubt asked for to enable Turkish Government to
conceal from Eastern world in general and its own population in particular fact
of Turkish defeat and to maintain to some extent Turkish prestige and power for
evil.’ The sub-committee did at least conclude that, ‘in view of the bitter
national animosity between Turks and Greeks’, it would be preferable to avoid
any Greek participation in the proposed military action against Constantinople
but this did not imply that the Ottoman capital should not be occupied at all;
indeed the committee members strongly deprecated any assurance being given to
the Turks which might hint that occupation would not become necessary as it was
‘only by such occupation that facts of situation can be effectively brought
home to Turkish mentality.’
Nevertheless, when the French made a move early in November to occupy
Constantinople with their 122nd division, Gough-Calthorpe protested vehemently
to London, recommending that ‘a generous spirit’ should be applied in
interpreting the terms of the armistice.
When the Admiral followed this with another plea, three days later, the Foreign
Office was forced to act.
Gough-Calthorpe was put in possession of the Foreign Office position in no
uncertain terms in a curt dispatch sent twelve hours after fighting had ceased
on the Western front:
…we
have no wish whatever to minimise the defeat and capitulation of the Turks. On
the contrary in the interests of the future peace of the Near East we are
determined that the Turkish domination over subject races shall irrevocably be
ended. It is best that Turks realise from outset that these are the terms which
we intend to impose. There is the additional consideration that the Moslems of
Egypt and India should realise that Turkey has been completely defeated and we
wish to give the Turkish Government no opportunity of implying that the
Armistice was a mere suspension of hostilities pending amicable negotiations.
You will see from the above that we wish you to observe the strictest reserve in
your relations with the Turkish Government and refuse to be drawn into any
discussions as to the eventual peace settlement.
This
warning from London coincided with the fall of the short-lived Government of
Izzet Pasha which had been hastily formed solely for the purposes of obtaining
the armistice; once this had been accomplished, and the opprobrium thus nobly
borne by Izzet, the way was open for a new ministry to be formed with the
liberal Tewfik Pasha (who had been Ambassador in London at the outbreak of war)
at its head.
Before long, the streets of Pera once more echoed to the sounds of English and
French as the Allied troops moved in to maintain order while the politicians
rancorously set to work to devise a peace treaty formally to end the War to end
all Wars.
The
heart of the Committee of Union and Progress, which had directed the affairs of
the Ottoman Empire since the Young Turk revolution of 1908 – the triumvirate
of Enver, Djemal and Talaat – slipped out of Constantinople on a German
freighter bound for Odessa on the night of 2 November 1918. Deeply implicated in
the wartime Armenian outrages, they were on the run not only from the victorious
allies who sought them to stand trial for their crimes but also from Armenians
out for revenge. Making their way to Berlin they remained in hiding till
approached by the Bolshevik Government with an offer to go to Moscow to continue
the ‘Turkish national struggle’; Enver and Djemal accepted the invitation,
Talaat preferred to remain in Berlin. There, in February 1921, he was visited by
Aubrey Herbert at the behest of Sir Basil Thompson of the Special Branch.
Herbert found that his robust, corpulent friend from pre-war days ‘had grown
thinner, and his good looks were sinister; his black hair was turning grey; his
eyes were very bright. The urbanity of his manners remained the same. He was
neat and well dressed, but obviously poor.’ Despite the shadow of the Armenian
atrocities the pair spent two amenable days together, Talaat fondly remembering
old, and better, days. Three weeks later he was dead, assassinated by a Persian
Armenian on 15 March 1921.
The self-imposed Russian exile of Enver and Djemal afforded them
protection of a sort, though at best it only guaranteed a stay of execution, not
a remission. Djemal spent time training the Afghan army before, while returning
to Moscow, he too fell at the hands of an Armenian near Tiflis on 21 July 1922.
Enver outlived him by a matter of weeks. He had left Moscow in the summer of
1921 hoping to capitalize on a Greek victory over Mustafa Kemal in the
Greco-Turkish War by taking Kemal’s place in Anatolia; instead it was Kemal
who prevailed. Enver retreated to Central Asia, there to proclaim an Islamic
Revolution. His enemies now included the Bolsheviks and, some time in early
August 1922, a red brigade caught up with him in Bokhara. As in life, so in
death, the truth about Enver is hard to ascertain: that he died heroically
leading a charge against the reds; that he was shot through the heart simply and
unglamorously; or, more gruesome, that his head was removed from his shoulders
by one strike from a sword while he drank at a fountain. The Ottoman Empire had
come to an end; the Turkish Republic was about to take its place.
Throughout the whole tangled and unhappy history of this period in
Mediterranean and Near Eastern affairs petty pride and importance played a more
substantial rôle than reasoned diplomacy or strategical insight, significant
though these factors undoubtedly were. Enver, Talaat, Djemal, Venizelos,
Constantine, Isvolsky, Sazonov, Milne, Troubridge, Lowther, Mallet and Churchill
— all proud men and all of whose lives were affected to a greater or lesser
degree by the struggle to control the narrow waterway separating Europe from
Asia: the Straits.
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