
The photograph above, of sailors aboard ship at the
Dardanelles, was kindly loaned by Caroline Richards, whose uncle is pictured
(lying, in the centre, with pipe)
The
Sub-Committee to consider the Dardanelles operation duly convened at 4 p.m.;
Churchill was present, but Fisher was not. The General Staff, Kitchener
reported, had examined three options: an attack on Austria from the Adriatic; an
attack on Austria in co-operation with the Serbs; or an attack on Turkey. The
first was ruled out due to the danger posed by Austrian submarines; poor weather
mitigated against the second option, though Churchill helpfully put forward the
suggestion that ‘special river monitors’ could be constructed for the Danube
(another sop to Fisher?). With regard to Turkey Churchill pointed out that
‘the navy can perhaps open the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to warships, which
are more or less impervious to field gun and rifle fire, but they cannot open
these channels to merchant ships so long as the enemy is in possession of the
shores.’
This meant troops. Churchill further argued that, as the Zeebrugge operation was
now abandoned, there was no longer any need to send out two Territorial
divisions in support of it; instead, they could be kept back together with the
XXIXth Division (the only regular division still available), meaning that only a
Canadian division need be sent across the Channel. This was, however, felt to be
beyond the competence of the Sub-Committee to decide and it was agreed that
Asquith should be asked to assemble an immediate meeting of the War Council,
which was ready to re-convene by 6.30 p.m.
Fisher, who was present this time, jumped at Churchill’s scheme for
Danube gunboats, declaring that a conference would be held the following day at
the Admiralty to consider the design! Once more Lloyd George obligingly endorsed
the proposal. Kitchener put forward his preferred option, that the four
divisions (two Territorials, the XXIXth and the Canadians) should be kept in
Britain as a reserve; failing this they could be dispatched to France on the
understanding that they might be withdrawn in a month. However the real
conclusion of the meeting, in Hankey’s opinion, was the tacit acceptance of
Churchill’s announcement. Assured of Fisher’s outward co-operation,
Churchill declared ‘that Admiralty had decided to push on with the project
approved at the meeting held on the 13th January, to make a naval attack at the
Dardanelles.’
In case he had not made his point clear, Kitchener maintained once more
that he had no troops to spare; he need not have worried, as Churchill was doing
the army’s job for it. ‘No doubt it would be very desirable, if only it were
possible,’ Balfour wrote a few days later,
to
have a land force – Greek or British – co-operating with the Fleet at
Gallipoli. But I understand the Admiralty view to be that with our 12 & 15
in. guns all the Turkish artillery could be silenced; and that, when silenced,
such light field guns as the enemy possessed would be insufficient effectually
to obstruct the passage of an armoured Fleet. If this be so (& it is a
purely technical question) the co-operation of a military force is not
absolutely necessary and the Fleet may for this operation be regarded as
self-sufficing. I do not remember any close parallel in naval history; but it
has rarely, if ever, happened before that guns mounted in ships have markedly
outranged guns mounted in fortresses…
For
this misapprehension Churchill had only himself to blame. Similarly, it was
later claimed on Kitchener’s behalf
that, when he protested about a purely naval attempt, Churchill alluded to the
‘marvellous potentialities of the Queen
Elizabeth’ to render comparatively easy a task which had been hitherto
impossible — that vessel’s ‘astounding effectiveness’ would
revolutionize all previous estimates of naval warfare.
Hankey, at least, was concerned. When, on 2 February, he wrote up the
minutes of the three separate meetings of 28 January he was, he confessed to
Asquith, ‘immensely impressed with the cumulative effect of the arguments
presented in favour of military action in the Dardanelles at the earliest
possible date.’ To support this he referred to Churchill’s assertion that
warships could force the passage but not guarantee to keep it open.
Coincidentally, the following day a Turkish force attempted to ‘throw a bridge
across the Suez Canal’ with the result, sardonically recorded by Asquith, that
the ‘poor things & their would-be bridge were blown into smithereens, and
they have retired into the desert...’
Unfortunately, this did nothing other than to reinforce Asquith’s opinion of
Turkish military prowess. Nevertheless Hankey’s views did eventually succeed
in converting Asquith who, following a long talk with the persuasive War Council
secretary on 13 February concerning the question of a military landing, declared
that he, too, had been for some time coming to the same opinion!
Fortuitously, Hankey then had a ‘faint recollection’ that the C.I.D. had
considered the question some years previously and it was therefore his ‘duty
to bring the papers to the notice of the War Council.’
In the meantime the question of joint Anglo-French action to assist
Serbia had been inconveniently revived by Millerand with ‘scant cordiality’;
yet, when Lloyd George visited Paris early in February, he found the rest of the
French Cabinet unaware of the proposal. The combative Chancellor, who had always
favoured this action, quickly put good the omission. As a result Delcassé then
visited London to declare that, now, the French Cabinet approved the idea in
principle: subject to Joffre’s consent, the French proposed to send a division
to Salonica at once (or at least, as Hankey noted, ‘a non-descript equivalent
force composed of 2 cavalry brigades, some Marines, & some Alpine
Chasseurs’). This was, however, conditional upon Britain also sending a
division; and this, in turn, was contingent upon obtaining the approval of Sir
John French, who attended the War Council meeting on the evening of 9 February
where the discussion was ‘as usual, rather rambling.’
Kitchener was adamant that if troops were to go at all to Salonica they had to
be the best and this meant the XXIXth Division. French at first demurred,
relying on an undertaking he had given Joffre, but eventually gave his reluctant
consent after being assured that the troops would only go to Salonica on the
assumption that Greece entered the war; and this was proving to be a large
assumption.
After the unsuccessful attempt in September 1914 to solicit Greek
assistance in a proposed Dardanelles campaign
the question of Greek participation in the War remained in abeyance until the
outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Turkey. Approached once more, in
November, the Greek Premier, Venizelos, remarked that ‘he would be delighted
to co-operate by sending troops to Egypt or in any way that H[is] M[ajesty’s]
G[overnment] may desire,’ but that, as previously, before doing so he required
‘to be assured against the danger from Bulgaria.’ However, as the British
Legation in Athens noted, ‘No means was found of at once effectively
guaranteeing Greece against Bulgarian attack and at the same time of maintaining
sufficiently friendly relations with Bulgaria to leave the door open for
possible co-operation on her part, and the question of Greek co-operation was
practically dropped.’
The subject was raised in more acute form following the launching of a major
Austro-Hungarian offensive against the Serbs; by mid-November the Serbian
position was desperate due to lack of ammunition. As early as September
Venizelos had been unofficially asked to facilitate the passage of Allied arms
to the beleaguered Serbs. He had, however, been ‘very reluctant’ to accede
to the request as, he maintained, he ‘would rather break neutrality openly.’
Venizelos’ discomfiture was ended on 12 November when a formal request was
delivered to the Premier to send ammunition from Greek stocks, which would then
be replaced by the Allies.
Following the fall of the Serbian capital, Belgrade, on 2 December the
Serbian Minister in Athens sought active Greek military assistance; again
Venizelos refused to aid his putative ally, once more citing his fear of
Bulgaria. In a final attempt to persuade the recalcitrant Premier, Britain,
France and Russia ‘guaranteed’ Greece against a Bulgarian attack and, for
his assistance if forthcoming, offered Venizelos Southern Albania. ‘This
communication’, the British Legation noted,
had
no better success than the previous one. M. Venezelos [sic]
was very hurt at the offer of S. Albania which he called “a piece of bread”
as against the “substantial banquet” offered to Bulgaria, and said no
guarantee by the Powers against Bulgaria could really be effective. A subsequent
suggestion from Athens that Russia should threaten Bulgaria with force met with
the reply that Russia did not at the moment “dispose of the forces necessary
to enforce her decision on Bulgaria.” M. Venezelos practically asserted on
Dec. 6 that “the only effectual guarantee would be the co-operation of
Bulgaria” and this has remained the key of the problem.
Fortunately
for Venizelos, the ‘marvellous’ recovery of the Serbian troops later in the
month (Belgrade was liberated on 14 December) eased that country’s plight. The
respite, however, would be temporary. Worn out following their tremendous
victory, in the New Year the Serbs would again be threatened with a fresh
Austrian offensive, this time supported by German troops. By 18 January 1915
Asquith noted that, according to his informant in the Balkans, there were clear
concerns ‘that the Serbs will be overwhelmed by the new attack wh[ich] Austria
is preparing unless some one comes at once to their assistance; Roumania for
preference, next Greece.’
The diplomatic offensive commenced anew. In the Cabinet that week Grey suggested
that Cyprus should be ‘dangled’ before the Greeks. According to Asquith,
‘It is not worth much to us, indeed nothing’, but ‘Grey thinks it w[oul]d
have a good moral effect to show that we were really prepared to part with
something we have instead of merely carving out & distributing other
people’s possessions.’
By now, Asquith was sufficiently alarmed to urge Grey ‘to put the strongest
possible pressure upon Roumania & Greece to come in without delay, & to
promise that if they will form a real Balkan bloc
we will send troops of our own to join them & save the situation. I am sure
that this is right, and that all our “side shows” — Zeebrugge,
Alexandretta, even Gallipoli — ought to
be postponed to this.’
Aware that Cyprus would be insufficient bait, on 23 January Grey sought
to tempt Venizelos with a vague promise of territorial concessions on the coast
of Asia Minor. At last the prospect of realizing the ‘Great Idea’ — ‘the
claims of Hellenism on the West of Asia Minor’
— was enough to persuade Venizelos to drop his insistence with regard to the
assured co-operation of Bulgaria. In its place he substituted another condition:
Roumania must now co-operate. The Bulgarians, he argued, could be bought off
with the promise of Cavalla,
the richest province in Macedonia, which had been occupied by the Greeks during
the Balkan Wars. In attempting to win over King Constantine, Venizelos
tendentiously argued that the sacrifice of 30,000 square kilometres of Cavalla
would be more than offset by the acquisition of ‘125,000’ square kilometres
in Asia Minor. Yet this latter figure was a deliberate invention, as Grey had
intentionally made an imprecise offer. ‘I firmly believe,’ Venizelos
informed the King, ‘that we ought to lay aside any hesitation. If we do not
take part in the war, whatever the result, the Hellenism of Asia Minor will be
lost to us finally.’
However, when it was put to him that the intervention of Allied troops might be
a substitute for Roumanian co-operation, Venizelos replied that he would accept
this proposal only if the intervention consisted of two British or French army
corps; and he would still require a formal treaty with the Roumanians
guaranteeing to attack Bulgaria should Bulgaria attack Greece or Serbia.
Venizelos was also anxious that his proposal for ceding Cavalla should ‘appear
to come’ from the British. Nevertheless, it appeared, finally, as if
Venizelos’ actions might actually match his rhetoric; at last there was a real
possibility of active Greek participation in aid of the Allied cause.
Anticipating this, Churchill wrote to Venizelos on 5 February to inform him of
the impending attack and to request the use of a Greek harbour near the
Dardanelles.
But once more events intervened. On 6 February Bulgaria accepted a large German
loan, prompting Venizelos to suppose that ‘in consequence all question of
making offers to her is abandoned.’
Grey was informed the same day that ‘Owing to attitude of Bulgaria and
Roumania, Monsieur Venizelos does not wish to be drawn into war. He thinks that
if Greece went to war without Roumania, there would be less chance of the latter
coming in.’
After receiving this latest rebuff from Venizelos, and following the
‘rambling’ War Council meeting on 9 February, Grey sent a telegram (which
Kitchener had helped to draft) to the British Minister in Athens with
instructions to hand it to the Greek Government if or when the French Minister
received similar instructions. Hankey found he could not do ‘full justice’
to the telegram, which contained ‘some rather subtle points’, but the
general sense was that:
Every
obligation of honour and of interest makes it necessary for Greece to go to the
assistance of Servia. In order to assist her to do this without danger to her
communications the Allies propose to send one Division apiece to Salonica. If
the Russian contingent is delayed the British and French Divisions will none the
less be sent forthwith…
Though
there was further ‘mild criticism’ from within the War Council, Asquith
swept this away by summing up the political and military advantages.
Even so, Hankey disliked the proposal save in one important respect, which he
outlined to Balfour (who was absent from the meeting) the following day:
…Personally
I disagree altogether with this Servian proposition…I am convinced that an
attack on the Dardanelles is the only extraneous operation worth trying. From
Lord Fisher downwards every naval officer in the Admiralty who is in the secret
believes that the Navy cannot take the Dardanelles position without troops. The
First Lord still professes to believe that they can do it with ships, but I have
warned the Prime Minister that we cannot trust to this. I understand, though,
that there are only 12,000 reserve Turkish troops in the Gallipoli peninsula,
& less than 3 Army Corps, mostly reservists, in this part of Turkey. A
relatively small force therefore will suffice. Nevertheless I am quite reconciled to the Salonica proposal, because I
am convinced that, if only we can get troops out to the Levant on any excuse
they will, if the Navy achieve any considerable measure of success, be landed at
Gallipoli!! I misread Lord K[itchener] altogether, if this is not so…
Hankey’s
opportunism at first seemed misplaced for, having resolutely avoided being drawn
into the war (despite appearances to the contrary), Venizelos was hardly likely
to be swayed by the promise of two divisions.
Unfortunately, the offer to Venizelos was meant to have coincided with the
opening of the bombardment against the Turkish forts but this was delayed and
would not commence until 19 February. Without the moral effect of the
bombardment, Venizelos found it easy to reject this latest offer.
Asquith became aware of this rejection on the 16th; the result was an
informal meeting
of the War Council (not even Hankey was present) which, nevertheless, arrived at
‘decisions of the very first importance’ — another characteristic example
of Asquith’s conduct of the war. Hankey’s surmise was now proved correct:
having negotiated the release of the XXIXth Division and following the Greek
refusal, there was now nowhere for the Division to go. It was decided therefore,
in the circumstances, to dispatch the troops to Lemnos, near the Dardanelles, at
the earliest possible date. In addition, a force would be sent from Egypt which,
in conjunction with four battalions of Royal Marines, would be available ‘in
case of necessity to support the naval attack on the Dardanelles.’ For Hankey,
who received details of the ad hoc
meeting from Asquith, Lloyd George and Fisher, the decision took a considerable
weight off his mind. ‘The Naval Attack on the Dardanelles forts begins on
Friday morning [19 February]’, Hankey informed Balfour, adding:
It
is agreed by all naval officers that sooner or later troops will be required. I
calculate that the XXIXth Division can be there by about March 10th (I do not
like to risk an earlier date) but at least a Division and perhaps more could
arrive from Egypt about a week earlier — an extra Australian Division having
recently arrived in Egypt. I am immensely relieved by this decision, though I
fear it has been made rather late & I should like more men. This is a
decisive operation against the decisive point of the Turkish Empire, and, if
undertaken at all we ought to throw in every man we have in the East, including
the garrison of Malta, all the Marines, & (though no-one agrees with me in
this) the troops in Mesopotamia. Still we may bring it off with the Navy, and,
if we fail, can pretend it was a feint & go to Smyrna or Alexandretta. I
don’t think there is any intention to land troops except to finish off work
which the Navy cannot quite complete. It is a pity we cannot get the Greeks to
send man for man with us to the Dardanelles, I have been urging that they should
be asked to do so, but I am told there are two objections — 1. The Russians
will not have the Greeks there. 2. The Greeks would probably refuse on the
ground that it would incapacitate them from fulfilling their treaty to come to
the assistance of Servia in the event of the intervention of Bulgaria…P.S.
Lord Fisher, who was very despondent over this Turkish business, is quite perky
again now.
And
so had the first seed, the Grand Duke’s appeal on New Year’s Day, borne
monstrous fruit. Everything was now set and the bombardment duly commenced on 19
February; however, when the War Council met the same day, to the deep chagrin of
Churchill, Kitchener suddenly entertained second thoughts! He had, he now
asserted, always favoured an operation at Alexandretta, an opinion shared by
Lieutenant-General Birdwood at the ANZAC headquarters in Cairo. Writing to
Kitchener on 14 February Birdwood could not understand the ‘very feeble &
abortive attack’ the Turks had made against the Canal. ‘The sooner I can get
off to Alexandretta the better’, he informed his ‘dear old Chief.’
Security was also becoming a problem: the troops in Egypt had been told they
would be starting for France soon, but the number of mules being purchased
resulted in speculation that the real destination might be much closer to hand.
Kitchener therefore argued in the War Council on the 19th that, as the Turks
were retreating from the Canal, the Egyptian garrison was sufficient for
repelling any further attacks. This, he maintained, meant that the 39,000
Australian and New Zealand troops training there could be freed to support the
naval attack which had commenced that morning; there was therefore no necessity
to dispatch the XXIXth Division. To justify his newly-found circumspection
Kitchener, who had always been loathe to send the XXIXth, used the paltry excuse
of the ‘recent Russian set-back in East Prussia.’
The effect of this on Churchill can be well imagined: the First Lord
expressed his ‘great disappointment’ and suggested that the Division should
be sent to Alexandria rather than Lemnos as originally proposed — ‘We should
never forgive ourselves if this promising operation failed owing to insufficient
military support at the critical moment.’ But the problem was that the
critical moment had been reached off
the Straits just as Churchill was speaking in London. Kitchener then agreed, in
quick succession, that if the absence of the XXIXth would jeopardize the
operation he would send it; that he had every intention of supporting the
operation but the ANZAC divisions on the spot were sufficient; and that there
were enough troops to guarantee success without sending the XXIXth ‘providing
that the navy was successful.’ Churchill again stressed the point he had
raised earlier, that the navy unaided could only open the Straits for armoured
ships. A passage for merchant ships could not be guaranteed unless the shores of
the Dardanelles were cleared.
Asquith and Hankey intervened at this point to circulate the
eight-year-old C.I.D. paper on the subject which Hankey had located and which
tended ‘to show that military co-operation was essential to success.’
All this must have been galling to Churchill who had spent the better part of
January convincing all and sundry that the navy could do the job alone! He was
in effect a prisoner of his own misguided enthusiasm.
But Hankey also did not have it all his own way, for, although the C.I.D. paper
did acknowledge that ‘if ever an attempt to force the Dardanelles is made, the
work will have to be undertaken by a Join Naval and Military expedition’, the
General Staff were not prepared at the time, ‘in view of the risks
involved’, to recommend its being attempted.
Hankey therefore had to steer the War Council into a ‘more or less desultory
discussion’ as to how far the 1906 paper ‘was applicable to present
conditions.’ It was pointed out that the Turks had since suffered ‘severe
defeats’ in the Balkan Wars, that they were currently engaged on three fronts
(the Caucasus, Mesopotamia and Egypt), and that submarines might greatly harass
Turkish communications with Gallipoli. There was also the possibility that
aerial reconnaissance would greatly assist the naval bombardment. This, Hankey
must have hoped, would be enough to counter the General Staff’s previous
reservations.
For the benefit of those around the table, Churchill (who had been
forewarned about the C.I.D. paper) then ‘recalled the various phases of the
question’:
The
first proposal was to send no troops at all, leaving the Dardanelles to be dealt
with by the Navy. The next phase was that the XXIXth Division only was to be
sent to Salonica in the view of thereby involving Greece in the war. Then the
situation had again changed by the Russian defeat in the East, and it became
desirable to ensure success at the Dardanelles. If this operation was
successful, it was possible that the Greeks might change their minds, and that a
complete change might be brought about in the Balkans.
This
was an elegant piece of sophistry from the First Lord. He had made the stages
seem a natural progression, whereas the first proposal had occupied all of
January, while Salonica and the Russian defeat had been very recent events.
Although Churchill again tied in success at the Dardanelles with the question of
supporting the Russians, his most revealing comment was that ‘to ensure
success in the Dardanelles’ troops must be available. This was very different
from his earlier arguments — arguments that had carried the day and that had
resulted in the bombardment which had just commenced. Nevertheless Kitchener
would not budge: he would send the XXIXth in case of necessity but ‘did not
want to send it just yet.’
The inconclusive meeting adjourned.
That afternoon the electrifying news of the opening bombardment was
received in London and quickly flashed around the world. Carden’s initial
barrage on the 19th – which achieved little and was promptly postponed when a
violent storm blew up that night – created an impression out of all proportion
to the damage inflicted. Wavering states reconsidered their position;
Venizelos’ mouth began to water anew.
In Constantinople the generally held opinion was that the Straits would soon be
forced and the capital threatened. Archives and gold were moved out of the city
and even the German Ambassador sought the protection of the American Embassy to
store his valuables. Ironically, only Enver believed that the Dardanelles could
not be forced; however, after his recent disastrous showing in the Caucasus, the
Pasha’s opinion was discounted.
Even though Carden had been unable to resume operations by the time the War
Council met again on 24 February success appeared to those present more or less
assured. More importantly, the assumption upon which the whole enterprise was
underpinned — that a failed attack could be broken off at any time — was
revealed to be hollow. The French had appealed for a delay in the operations so
that military arrangements could be concerted between the two Governments but
Grey informed Cambon on 20 February that ‘it would be disastrous to postpone
or delay these operations. So much that is important to the common cause depends
upon their success.’
On the morning of the 24th Carden, who had been pressured in the first place to
supply a plan using ships alone, was now informed by Churchill that ‘It is not
proposed at this stage to use military force other than parties of Marines
landed to destroy particular guns or torpedo tubes. On the other hand, if your
operation is successful, we consider it necessary that ample military force
should be available to reap the fruits.’
Later that day the War Council resumed the debate over the fate of the
XXIXth Division. With a comparatively small number of troops Churchill argued
‘we might be in Constantinople by the end of March …Moreover, we were now
absolutely committed to seeing through the attack on the Dardanelles.’ Lloyd
George and Grey both uttered similar statements. Kitchener wavered only
slightly: he was
prepared
to send the XXIXth Division, if necessity was shown. He felt that, if the fleet
would not get through the Straits unaided, the army ought to see the business
through. The effect of a defeat in the Orient would be very serious. There could
be no going back. The publicity of the announcement had committed us.
Hankey
had almost achieved his aim. From his ‘Boxing Day’ Memorandum to his attempt
to influence discussions in the War Council to his behind-the-scenes activity in
support of his own grand strategic conception, the one consistent element in the
‘Drift to the Dardanelles’ was provided by the egocentric figure of Maurice
Hankey. Two days later, following the resumption of the bombardment, the War
Council met again when further heavy pressure was applied to Kitchener;
the Secretary of State remained obdurate. It was not until 10 March that he
finally relented and agreed to the dispatch of the XXIXth Division. At that
point, following a not always natural progression, the simple expedient of a
diversionary bombardment to aid the hard pressed Russians had developed into a
full scale combined operation with a morbid momentum of its own. If Fisher
originally turned the key in the ignition, while Hankey had his hands on the
wheel, it was Churchill’s foot on the accelerator; but the vehicle they were
now all travelling in was unusual in one important respect. It had no brake.
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