On
7 September 1914 the Admiralty, ‘not satisfied with the reasons adduced for
the failure to carry out [his] clear duty in either attacking the enemy or
heading him off’, decided to recall Rear-Admiral Troubridge to face a Court of
Inquiry over the escape of Goeben and Breslau.
Perhaps aware that recriminations would also eventually commence to explain the
failure to prevent Turkey’s adherence to the Entente, Ambassador Mallet got in
the first shot when he declared, as early as 11 September, that ‘There is
already an impression that, by manner of detaining Turkish men-of-war, and by
letting the Goeben escape we are largely responsible for the present
difficulties’.
This was directed, in particular, at Churchill but could Mallet have also meant
that the ships had been allowed to escape as a matter of policy?
It was also in September that Mallet, in an unguarded moment, confessed that
Britain had conspired to let in Goeben
and Breslau ‘because she had a “lively interest” in not allowing
the Straits to fall into Russian hands.’
The presence of the two modern ships would, so the theory went, forestall a
Russian seaward descent upon Constantinople. Naturally, however, this
‘excuse’ conveniently spared Mallet’s blushes in having to admit that the
ships had escaped by virtue of superior German strategic awareness and British
bungling on a massive scale,
all of which, additionally, occurred while Mallet was away from his post on
leave in the belief that nothing would happen on the international scene!
Nevertheless, it is possible to find other references which also imply that the
escape was not a blunder but a deliberate act of policy.
On 10 August, for example (the day Souchon finally reached the
Dardanelles), a discussion took place in the Quai d’Orsay involving Isvolsky,
the Russian Ambassador, and French officials at which mention was made of
Turkish fears concerning Russian designs on the Straits. In that case, the
French considered that ‘it might be advantageous for us to draw Turkey to the
number of our enemies in order to make an end of her.’ The presence of the
German ships would, it was thought, give the Turks no option other than to join
the Central Powers and, when eventually defeated, there would then be ‘nothing
to prevent us in the liquidation of the war, in settling the question of the
Straits conforming to our views.’
However, whatever the French might have said to Isvolsky, these views might not
necessarily have encompassed a Russian occupation of Constantinople. Similarly,
the assiduous wooing of Greece fostered the belief that the British desired to
put the Greeks in Constantinople for the sole purpose of keeping the Russians
out.
By October Admiral Kerr’s involvement, and the possibility of his leading a
Greek force to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula (as proposed by Churchill) was an
open secret amongst the British naval personnel in the Mediterranean.
Yet, as the evidence I have produced previously indicates, if there were a
conspiracy afoot to see the German ships in Constantinople it originated not in
London or Paris, but in Athens.
Indeed Sir Edward Grey, to some extent misled on the political situation
in Constantinople by the over-optimistic reports of Mallet, was eager to
maintain Turkish neutrality for as long as possible to avoid Muslim agitation in
India and Egypt; he made his position on this known to the French and Russians
within days of the outbreak of war.
The Russians were also separately informed on 13 August that, should Turkey
accrue Russian territory as a result of a successful attack, the position would
be rectified in the terms of peace. Indeed, during that week a series of
assurances and warnings were given regarding Turkish territorial integrity of
which it has been said that ‘These statements may not have amounted to a clear
promise to deliver Constantinople and the Straits to Russia in the event of a
Russo-Turkish war, but they went a long way towards it.’
However, Grey’s position remained somewhat in advance of that of Sazonov, who,
in September, still intimated that the Turks would be allowed to remain in
Constantinople.
Sazonov’s ambivalent attitude soon changed following the closure of the
Straits on 26 September; the fate of Constantinople was once more on the agenda.
The Russian plans to attack Turkey through Persia caused immediate alarm when
they became known in Whitehall. The day after the British declaration of war
against Turkey in November 1914 the Russian Ambassador in London was notified by
Sazonov that the launching of his country’s offensive would, of necessity,
violate Persian neutrality. Grey was concerned on two fronts: the threat of
Muslim agitation, and the possibility that the planned offensive might spread to
include British political and oil interests in Mesopotamia. The Foreign
Secretary took the initiative on 9 November in suggesting to Sazonov that, with
the defeat of Germany, the fate of Constantinople and the Straits could not but
be decided other than in conformity to Russia’s interests.
This opinion was also shared by the King, who declared to the Russian Ambassador
that, ‘In regard to Constantinople, it is clear that it must be yours.’
If it was the case that the Foreign Secretary was prepared to hand over
Constantinople to the Russians, what other prize was worth the sacrifice? Grey
became distinctly nervous at the thought of Russian encroachment in Persia,
which directly threatened British interests in the Gulf and, more seriously,
India itself. Maintaining Persia as a buffer therefore assumed paramount
importance in the counsels of the Foreign Office. This, in itself, was a
suitable reason for Grey not to have been overly concerned when balancing the
scales by hoping to trade Constantinople for a free hand in Southern Persia and
the Gulf. But was there another, underlying, reason to explain the British
desire to maintain their position in Persia? To what extent was the Royal Navy
dependent upon the vast reserves of oil believed to exist beneath the
inhospitable desert? How did Grey and Churchill view the German participation in
the Baghdad railway project and the German quest for oil for their own navy,
which appeared as if it would lead to confrontation in the desolate wastes of
Mesopotamia? Was the Constantinople ‘deal’ a simple equation — the Straits
for Russia and the oil for Britain? To begin to answer these questions it is
necessary to return to 1901 when William Knox D’Arcy obtained an oil
concession in Persia.
This was soon turned to advantage when, the following year, the Russians
proposed to build an oil pipeline from Northern Persia to the Gulf which, while
not serving the obvious purpose of delivering oil, provided a convenient excuse
for Russian peaceful penetration in an area where they were decidedly unwelcome.
The Russian scheme was quashed by offering the Shah the loan he was seeking in
the form of an advance from D’Arcy.
In such a roundabout way D’Arcy had performed his first service for the
British Government.
At the same time and after a series of exhaustive tests – first in
stationary boilers on shore, then in dockyard trials, and finally on seagoing
warships – the Admiralty decided to adopt oil fuel; initially, however, it
would be only as an auxiliary to be burnt in conjunction with coal. Oil would be
brought into use gradually; to begin with seven battleships and three armoured
cruisers were converted so as to be able to utilize, in part, the new fuel. On
11 November 1903 the Admiralty Oil Fuel Committee met for the first time with a
remit to investigate actual and potential sources of supply existing in British
territory or within British spheres of influence and with a guiding principle
that it was ‘inexpedient to depend in peace time upon resources which would
probably fail in war time.’ The results were not encouraging. Russia and
Roumania were soon eliminated as no reliance could be placed on certainty of war
time supplies, while, in the U.S. – which initially appeared a more promising
prospect – a coal strike in 1902 had created an increased home demand for oil,
leaving little to be exported; there was also the additional disadvantage that
Texas oil had to be specially desulphurized for naval use. It was evident to the
Committee then, ‘that the quantities of fuel oil available and in sight are
much less than has hitherto been supposed, and there can be little doubt that,
at the best, only sufficient will be obtainable for use as an auxiliary to coal.
Oil must therefore be regarded as a supplement not a substitute.’
Because of this scarcity and the impossibility of relying upon casual
purchases, the Committee recommended the formation of a substantial reserve of
oil fuel with contracts arranged for definite supplies over a period of years.
This recommendation was acted upon by the Admiralty on 19 July 1904. Two
problems immediately presented themselves: first, that where oil existed or was
thought to exist in British territory, foreign syndicates might intervene
‘whose policy is to secure control of any oil deposits of a promising
character, not necessarily with the object of working them, but of shutting them
down and excluding would-be exploiters, in order to curtail competition and
artificially manipulate the world’s supplies…’ Second, even by 1905, world
production of crude oil amounted only to 30 million tons (compared with 900
million tons of coal), with the bulk of the supply being drawn from non-British
sources.
When all the other competing sources were eliminated Persia appeared to
offer the best prospects of promising supplies in a British sphere of interest.
There, D’Arcy’s concession had been ‘acquired in British interests, and
negotiations have privately taken place between him and the [Oil Fuel]
Committee, with a view to keeping the enterprise, as far as possible, under
British influence, and to give the Admiralty a call upon the production.’ By
1907 however D’Arcy’s syndicate had expended large sums with little to show
for it; furthermore, his work was continually being hampered by native tribes
disinclined to recognize a concession granted by the Shah. In the meantime such
exotic substances as Scotch shale oil and Russian ostatki
(best residual oil) in addition to oil from Burma, Borneo and Barbados had all
been tried satisfactorily in British ships, although the principal source
continued to be Texas oil with its attendant problems. By late 1907 tank storage
for 20,000 tons had been erected at Portland and a further 25,000 tons was
stored in leased tanks by the Thames.
Fisher’s accession as First Sea Lord in October 1904 ensured a rapid
build-up of oil fired ships. Long a convert to the benefits of oil, Fisher had
been advocating its adoption to Lord Selborne as early as December 1901.
He wasted no time in transforming thought to action, starting with the
ocean-going torpedo boat destroyers and first class torpedo boats of the 1905-06
programmes, which were all designed and built to burn oil only. Unfortunately,
Fisher’s mania for oil came at an awkward moment as D’Arcy was in trouble:
harassed, short of funds, and on the point of giving up the search. The outcome,
following secret negotiations, was that the Admiralty persuaded the
Glasgow-based Burmah Oil Company to inject new capital and take over
D’Arcy’s concession — this assured that drilling would continue but did
not solve the immediate problem as the new syndicate could not find oil either.
Edged out of Persia following the take-over, D’Arcy himself continued
in his efforts to obtain an oil concession in Mesopotamia, convinced that
deposits could be found there even if his faith in the potential of this region
was shared by few others. As honorary attaché in Constantinople in 1905 Mark
Sykes had gathered information from European investigators sent to the area,
which he combined with findings from German engineers who had worked in the
region four years previously. With this evidence he produced an ambitious report
– The Petroliferous Districts of
Mesopotamia – in which he urged that British consuls in the area should be
directed to validate his findings before competitors moved in. His
recommendations were quietly filed away at the Foreign Office.
In Persia meanwhile, by the start of 1908 the Burmah Oil syndicate, thoroughly
discouraged, had had enough. Then, in a scene more reminiscent of Hollywood,
just as all seemed lost, the first great oil strike was made in May — at the
last possible moment. Upon the basis of this strike, the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company (APOC) was floated on the London Stock Exchange in April 1909, the
shares being taken up within half an hour of being offered.
With Persia now guaranteed as a source of fuel and the concession firmly in
British hands attention focused again on Mesopotamia where D’Arcy was making
little headway in his attempts to obtain the concession there.
By 1911 the British had a new menace to contend with: German peaceful
penetration into the Persian Gulf, an unwelcome addition to Russian encroachment
from the north. Information was received privately by Sir Arthur Nicolson at the
Foreign Office in July of that year ‘of the efforts being made by the Germans
to extend their influence in these parts.’ Germans, it was reported, were
buying large quantities of grain at heavy losses and then, on the basis of the
resulting shipments, were publishing statistics showing that their trade in the
region was increasing by leaps and bounds: ‘on this showing, Germany, it is
anticipated, will claim an interest, and endeavour to exert an authority in Gulf
matters, which do not properly belong to her…’
This raised serious implications given the Navy’s headlong rush to construct
oil-only ships, a trend which was furthered when another oil ‘maniac’,
Churchill, was transferred to the Admiralty in October 1911. By that time there
were 189 vessels built or building depending wholly or in part on oil, and
consuming 200,000 tons annually. Yet Churchill found that, instead of the
expected ‘considerable reserve’ of oil fuel, all that existed was enough for
four months’ expenditure for ships using oil only and three months’ for
ships using oil and coal!
Without hesitation Churchill set up a Departmental Committee, under the
auspices of Captain William Pakenham, the Fourth Sea Lord. The terms of
reference were simply defined:
1.
How can a sufficient supply of oil be obtained and a sufficient reserve stored
in the United Kingdom to enable us to use oil fuel only in all new construction?
2.
What steps should be taken to establish the reserve of oil fuel? From what
sources, in what ships, and along what routes should it be obtained?
3.
In what circumstances, at what expense, and up to what date will it be possible
to convert the four battleships and one cruiser of the 1911-12 programme into
‘oil only’? What addition to the existing reserves of oil fuel would be
necessary on this account alone?
4.
Generally to report on the advantages, or otherwise, of relying upon oil for the
Naval Service including effects on personnel, and cost.
As
a result of the Committee’s findings, in addition to a recommendation of
twelve months’ wartime supply, it was decided to lay down a division of fast
battleships; to design a fast, light armoured cruiser; and to continue the
destroyer programme with the aim of achieving an even higher speed. There was
one casualty however for, with the prospect looming of a 26 knot battleship,
‘the battle cruiser was put into temporary and perhaps permanent abeyance.’
As far as the smaller vessels of this new programme were concerned the point of
no return in relation to oil had been reached. As Churchill admitted, ‘The
light armoured cruisers simply could not be constructed on a coal-burning basis.
They would have to be greatly increased in length, in which case they would
become too expensive craft for the numbers and service required, or they would
lose from 3 to 4 knots speed, and be consequently quite unfitted for the
tactical duties for which they were designed. Without the permanent use of
‘oil only’ this excellent type would be permanently denied us…’ A
similar argument applied to the destroyers.
For a sizeable portion of the Navy therefore the possession of guaranteed
supplies of oil had become essential. Churchill subsequently maintained that he
‘found that no difficulty had been experienced in buying all the oil that was
needed’ — but it was not that simple, as Francis Hopwood discovered when
dining with Watts, the Director of Naval Construction, who contrived to mix oil
with the wine. Hopwood, an additional Civil Lord at the Admiralty, informed
Churchill that Watts ‘rather astonished me by saying that there was no
difficulty whatsoever in designing a Dreadnought to use oil only…but that it
had never been done because “we have not got the oil”. This gives me a
clearer understanding of Fisher’s attitude as to construction going hand in
hand with oil purchase.’ Hopwood also learned that the German Government had
acquired ‘very large oil interests’ in Galicia and Roumania by the
‘interesting device’ of buying sufficient shares in indigenous companies to
acquire voting control. ‘By this method’, he argued, ‘the [German]
Government is not put in the awkward position of owning and managing a great
commercial undertaking in a foreign country but they are in a position to
regulate price, output and destination of supply!’
In an attempt to find a solution to the problems of supply Churchill now
proposed the appointment of a Royal Commission on Oil Fuel, with none other than
Fisher as chairman. But the voluble old sea dog had fallen out with Churchill
over the question of the appointment of, amongst others, Sir Berkeley Milne to
command the Mediterranean Squadron. Churchill thereupon took the opportunity of
a Mediterranean cruise aboard the Admiralty yacht in May 1912 to rebuild
bridges: Fisher, then residing at Naples, was reluctant at first to accept the
First Lord’s offer but succumbed to a judicious mixture of flattery and
pleading from Churchill (and Asquith, who was also present). Churchill put it to
Fisher thus: ‘Find us oil in sufficient quantities and at a reasonable price
in peace, & without interruption in war, make us feel we can count on it
& swim on it…’
Presented with such a challenge Fisher at first accepted — and then declined!
He wished to enlarge the terms of reference of the proposed Commission to cover
design as well, with particular emphasis on his pet project for an ‘internal
combustion engine’ battleship.
Churchill gave Fisher some leeway by allowing that, so long as the ‘old
controversies’ were not needlessly revived, and the Committee’s
representative character was maintained, he did not ‘care a damn whom you
choose to assist you’. However, Churchill strenuously declared, the Royal
Commission would have to be advisory and not executive: ‘It will assemble
facts & state conclusions. It cannot touch policy or action.’
Fisher relented once more.
Captain Philip Dumas, who was appointed Secretary to the Commission, quickly
realized what he was in for: at preliminary meetings with Fisher he discovered
the latter already bent on subjugating certain members of the Committee. Dumas
resignedly noted in his diary that ‘it seems to me all it is being called
together for is to register foregone conclusions on the part of Fisher and
Churchill.’
The Admiralty’s problems had by no means been solved after the Persian
oil strike of 1908: the oil had indeed been found but many years would pass
before refineries could be built and pipelines constructed. It was only in May
1912 that the first cargo of oil was ready to leave. Furthermore, the APOC was a
relatively small player in the oil game and found that its markets were already
at the mercy of the large combinations Standard Oil and Shell.
Shell, in particular, sought favour at the Admiralty, but with a 60% holding
owned by Royal Dutch Petroleum, the company was thought to be susceptible to
German influence and was viewed with suspicion.
Official dislike of Shell was not ameliorated when it became known in August
1912 that, in his quest for the Mesopotamia oil concession, D’Arcy now faced
competition from the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) which was owned 50% by the
National Bank of Turkey,
25% by the Deutsche Bank, and 25% by a subsidiary of Royal Dutch-Shell.
Then, in October, financial necessity induced the APOC to sign an agreement with
Shell by which the latter purchased large amounts of crude and refined products,
though not fuel oil.
Shell had already tried before, unsuccessfully, to force a merger between
themselves and the APOC and were now using their attempt to obtain the
concession in Mesopotamia as a lever to attain their goal. With Shell ensconced
on their flank in Mesopotamia, Anglo-Persian would be extremely vulnerable.
Charles Greenway, APOC’s managing director, predicted that, if victorious in
the race for the Mesopotamiam concession, Shell would start a price war which
would leave the APOC exposed and unable to resist a merger; once this objective
had been achieved Shell could then force the price up, with dire consequences
for the Navy.
Greenway’s alarmist views prevailed at both the Foreign Office and the
Admiralty, as was made clear when Nicolson informed Marling, who was in charge
in Constantinople while Lowther was on leave, that:
After
consulting with the Admiralty, who do not at all like the idea of a foreign
syndicate having control of large oil supplies in Mesopotamia, we have…told
the National Bank that we are unable to support their request for a concession.
Of course our main reason is that we have already advocated and supported the
demands of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., and it would certainly be unfair to the
latter to encourage a competitor who is largely backed up by foreign capital.
The reason which we have given to the National Bank is simply that we have
already pledged ourselves to support Mr D’Arcy and company and that it is
therefore impossible at a late hour to encourage another competitor, but we are
going to verbally tell Babington-Smith [a director of the Bank] confidentially
that after considering the whole matter our Government do not like the idea of
entrusting to a syndicate which, though nominally British, is in reality
composed of two very powerful foreign syndicates the control of so large a
supply of oil fuel…
Having
thus seen off the competition in Mesopotamia, Greenway turned his hand towards
strengthening the precarious financial position by brazenly suggesting that his
company might receive a Government subsidy.
Greenway gave evidence at Fisher’s Royal Commission on 19 November 1912
and outlined the perceived threat from Shell.
When Fisher had finished his questioning Sir Frederick Black, the Director of
Navy Contracts, then took the opportunity to clear up the subject of German
influence. Suppose, he asked Greenway, Anglo-Persian and Shell were compelled to
come to an arrangement and that the Foreign Office then backed both companies in
the attempt to obtain the Mesopotamian concession — was Greenway suggesting
that, in that eventuality, German influence would necessarily come in?
‘Absolutely,’ was Greenway’s less than reassuring answer. Greenway claimed
that, in Persia, the APOC held the biggest oil concession ‘perhaps in the
whole world’ and there was a distinct possibility that the Mesopotamian
oilfields would be just as valuable as the Persian; however they had now arrived
at the stage of actual production and had ‘to make up their minds whether to
attach themselves to the Admiralty or the Shell Group’ who were pressing them
to come to an understanding. Greenway proposed that the Admiralty should enter a
contract with the APOC, either directly or through the Indian Government, for
half a million tons of fuel oil per annum: a contract over fifteen or twenty
years ‘would meet their requirements and would prevent their being absorbed by
the Shell Combine, provided they have a guarantee and a subsidy’. Greenway
placed a suggested figure on the subsidy of £100,000 per annum.
As wily as ever, Fisher, anticipating the fact that witnesses before his
Commission might request Government financial aid, had prepared a draft
memorandum five days before Greenway appeared. The proper course, he felt, was
for the Commission to obtain all the useful information they could for the
guidance of the Government, and leave it to the Government to decide. In a
further blow to Greenway’s crusade, Fisher was not, at that stage, unduly
concerned with the nationality of the sources of supply, being ‘confident that
available supplies of oil-fuel for the next 20 years will be so abundant that we
need not trouble about national control or trade monopolies, and that we may
safely go on buying in the cheapest market for the time being, though the
removal of all cause for anxiety will only be completely achieved by getting
sufficiently large stocks of oil accumulated within the next few years, and to
this end there should be a steady progressive programme of Government storage to
provide fully for a great war, and keep us independent of any sudden rise of
prices engineered by the trade.’
Fisher was not entirely convinced by Greenway’s performance on 19
November and, at one point, caustically inquired whether the APOC’s
‘magnificent patriotism’ was not a convenient excuse for making large
profits. Equally however, Captain Dumas, the secretary, was unhappy when, after
lunch, it was the turn of Marcus Samuel to give evidence. Although the summary
of his evidence conceded that the Royal Dutch had ‘absolutely a controlling
voice in the policy of the Shell Company’ so that, if they won an Admiralty
contract, ‘the foreign directors or foreign influence would have to concur’.
Samuel was confident this would not be a problem: ‘but, of course’, he
sanguinely maintained, ‘they would concur as, fortunately, they are extremely
pro-British.’
It was not difficult however to see the cause of Dumas’ unease: he felt that
Samuel had given himself away by acknowledging that oil could not be supplied
without the consent of the foreign directors. ‘As they are Dutch’, Dumas
recorded in his diary, ‘and again controlled by the Deutsche Bank our
condition in time of war can better be imagined then described unless we possess
ample reserve storage in England.’ Not content with leaving the matter there,
Dumas (somewhat unconstitutionally) ‘Wrote a long letter to Sir A. Nicolson on
the possible gains by supporting the Anglo-Persian oil fields’
and, to lend added emphasis, he included with his letter to Nicolson a clipping
from the Financial News of 14 November suggestively entitled “Will Germany
control the Oil Supply for our Navy?”
Dumas need not have been unduly concerned as the Foreign Office was ahead
of the Admiralty in accepting the need for Government support for Anglo-Persian.
The following morning, 20 November, a meeting was held at the Foreign Office
between representatives from the Admiralty, India Office and Board of Trade.
Despite the evidence of the previous day, when he had interrogated Greenway
about the alleged extent of German influence, Sir Frederick Black was still
loathe to consider the question of a subsidy, preferring the Admiralty to remain
a free agent. Following the meeting Grey wrote to the Admiralty to ascertain if
they no longer cared that the APOC might be swallowed by Shell? In that case,
‘if there are not sufficient public grounds on which to give the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company more than diplomatic support the Foreign Office cannot urge them to
hold out against the advantageous invitations to throw in their lot with the
Shell combine.’
The Admiralty did not reply to this transparent threat until 28 December.
Long before this, on 27 November, Fisher’s Royal Commission had
produced its first report. The members were left in no doubt as to the
advantages of oil: the ‘oil-only’ ship possessed a marked superiority of
speed over the ‘coal’ or ‘coal and oil’ ship; the radius of action using
oil was increased by 40% for the same weight of fuel; oil enabled a fleet to
refuel at sea; this, in turn, conferred on the British fleet a special advantage
in not being forced to leave its fighting position in order to refuel (the
strength of the fleet would be ‘thereby increased by at least 25%’); oil was
easy to load and store, whereas coaling was lengthy and laborious; oil allowed a
much more rapid increase in steam production; in a coal ship when part of the
coal had been burnt the ship could not attain full power except by taking men
from the guns to trim coal in the bunkers; and oil also held out the hope of
producing ships fulfilling given conditions of speed and armament but upon
lesser dimensions and, therefore, at smaller cost.
With regard to reserves, the members were of the ‘decided opinion that the
stock of oil-fuel should never be allowed to fall below at least four years’
current peace consumption.’ In the meantime, ‘Every acceleration in the
accumulation of this reserve will directly increase the security of the nation
against war risks, price combinations and fluctuations of supplies.’
Still Dumas remained uneasy: although he confided that in going so far as
to recommend, perhaps unexpectedly, a four year peace reserve ‘everyone [was]
equally pleased & surprised & rather frightened at what they’ve
done’ he was forced to admit that it was also ‘rather a tall order &
based on nothing really logical & it is this aspect which worries me as I
foresee it will devolve upon me to justify it from the evidence.’
Dumas’ conviction that it would fall to him to argue the case stemmed in large
part from the fact that Fisher, in line with the condition he had already
attempted to impose, had been diverted and now seemed more interested in his
latest project — the internal combustion engine battleship. Fisher had become
convinced that the Germans were ahead in these ‘motor’ ships: ‘They have
killed 15 men in experiments and we have not killed one!’ he lamented to Esher.
Fisher took his infatuation so far that he had already threatened to resign from
the Royal Commission unless Churchill agreed to lay down an internal combustion
battleship.
The First Lord had other things to worry about. While confirming the
Admiralty view to the Foreign Office – that the APOC should not receive direct
financial support as, by so doing, the Admiralty might risk cutting off other
sources of supply – Churchill raised the question which, though often
otherwise unstated, would bedevil the negotiations. By lending whole hearted
support to the Persian oil fields the time might come when naval and military
action could be needed to protect the operation.
In addition, the Royal Commission’s recommendation regarding reserves had
caused consternation in the Admiralty, where it was reported that there was a
considerable faction wanting to revert to coal for the new ‘fast’ division
of battleships two of which – Queen
Elizabeth and Warspite – had already been laid down. However, when an attempt
was made to debate the Commission’s report at the C.I.D. on 7 January 1913,
Asquith promptly declared that ‘it was a matter of high policy and so for
discussion by the Cabinet alone.’
Churchill’s strategy of getting Fisher to preside over a tame Royal Commission
which would do no more than reiterate the importance of oil had backfired
spectacularly. ‘The only consequence of prescribing impossible standards like
those proposed by the Royal Commission,’ he fumed to Battenberg the day after
the C.I.D. meeting, ‘will be to arrest the adoption of oil in the British
Fleet with consequent loss.’
Having been foiled by Fisher, Churchill instead instructed Battenberg to
set the War Staff on the problem. Acting under Battenberg’s directions, the
War Staff, Churchill ordered, ‘must be the prime authority for prescribing the
reserve of fuel oil…This is a question of principle which is governed solely
by military considerations.’ Not content with overthrowing at a stroke the
Commission’s recommendation, Churchill also dictated the guidelines for the
War Staff investigation: it was not up to the War Staff to concern themselves
‘with question of price or market ‘corners’ or other commercial aspects.
It may be assumed that for a purpose so vital as the supply of oil to the Fleet
in time of war the British Government could afford to pay a price which, so far
as commercial considerations go, would command a market.’ Churchill could not
understand why, with British command of the sea, there should be any difficulty
‘in bringing the necessary oil ships to British ports safely’ thus obviating
the need for over-generous reserves.
The Director of the Operations Division was put to work to produce a memorandum
on the transportation of oil: he reported that, although the supply of Persian
oil might become unreliable in the event of trouble with Russia, its shipment to
the U.K. presented no great problem so long as Britain maintained maritime
supremacy in the Indian Ocean ‘on a scale sufficient to make it very
improbable that our command of those seas could be disputed with a reasonable
chance of success.’
During
January 1913 the conflict between the relative merits of Anglo-Persian and Shell
deepened. A blow was struck against Shell when a memorandum on Oil Supplies was
prepared for the Cabinet which highlighted the alleged cartel believed to be
operated by Standard Oil and Shell, the two giants of the industry. Furthermore,
Shell’s capital was thought to derive in considerable part from German
financial sources (with the Deutsche Bank being especially involved) and it was
known that German financial interests were active in seeking oil in Galicia,
Roumania, Russia and, now, were chasing the Mesopotamian concession.
Yet, while this detracted from Shell other factors operated in its favour,
particularly the favourable impression made upon Fisher by Henri Deterding, the
Managing Director and guiding light of the company, as opposed to Marcus Samuel,
the Chairman and figurehead.
On the other hand, to the APOC’s detriment, Greenway’s continual bleating
was beginning to wear thin. Louis Mallet, then still at the Foreign Office
before replacing Lowther in Constantinople, complained:
I
do not like the attitude of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company who have hitherto
posed as being ultra-imperialist. Mr. Greenway first comes to me and hints that,
if the Shell obtain the Mesopotamian oilfields it will be difficult for the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company to resist coming to an agreement with them — unless
the Admiralty can give them a contract. I did not at that time understand that
an agreement meant more than an understanding as to the sale price of oil.
Greenway now threatens complete absorption with the Shell unless the Admiralty
give him a contract and the question of the Mesopotamian oilfields seems to have
dropped out entirely…
Mallet
laid a trap for Greenway. During discussions on 9 January Greenway was forced to
admit that as, without Admiralty support, Anglo-Persian would inevitably have to
merge with Shell, the company no longer needed Foreign Office assistance in its
attempt to obtain the Mesopotamian concession. This threat of the withdrawal of
diplomatic support was confirmed by letter on 5 February.
The ruse worked in that not only did Greenway declare that he personally
strongly opposed the merger with Shell, but he also confided that Shell was
attempting to gain control of the Mexican oilfields and that, ominously,
Anglo-Persian had been approached by the German Government to quote for oil
supplies in anticipation of a long-term contract.
The focus then shifted back to the Royal Commission which continued to
take evidence before submitting its second report on 27 February 1913. On the
day before the report was delivered Deterding himself gave evidence in an
attempt to defuse the anti-Shell testimony. When asked – given the controlling
interest of Royal Dutch in Shell – what would happen if in a war Germany
threatened Holland, Deterding insouciantly maintained ‘We could snap our
fingers at Germany. What can the German Government do? They can write very nasty
letters and say anything they like to the Dutch Government, but that has not
anything to do with us…’ Sir Frederick Black, still on the trail of the
German influence, asked Deterding directly whether there was any German element
of any importance in the combine: ‘Not a penny’, came the
none-too-convincing answer.
Although Fisher continued to be impressed the second report paid little
heed to Deterding’s last ditch efforts to reassure the Commission about Shell.
With recent evidence pointing to the Royal Dutch-Shell combination acquiring
control of a large proportion of the available supply the Commission found its
apprehension justified that:
unless
forward contracts for deliveries of oil-fuel extending over a number of years
are promptly made with producing companies at present independent, much higher
prices will have to be paid, and that in certain circumstances which may arise
it might be impossible to obtain at any price supplies from some of the more
important of the existing sources.
Although
the Commission reiterated its previous stance against deciding upon the relative
merits of the competing claims it was now felt desirable ‘as a general
principle, for the Government to give financial help in cases where such help
may be necessary for the preservation of independence of control of important
sources of supply already developed.’
By thus supporting the APOC’s existing Persian fields the company would
thereby have the capital to develop the neighbouring Mesopotamian fields,
assuming of course they were successful in obtaining the concession.
Lending urgency to the recommendation for forward contracts was the rapid
increase in the price of oil, making it all the more important for the Admiralty
to try to take advantage of fixed prices; conversely, in a rising market, the
prospect for the oil producers of being tied to a price years ahead was not
generally attractive.
Looking five years ahead, the only increased supply predicated by Sir Frederick
Black came from Persia: with all the other sources remaining constant, Persia
was forecast to increase from 2,000 tons per month in 1913-14 to 16,000 tons per
month for 1917-18.
These figures were too low for Churchill’s liking, the result in part of the
demanding Admiralty specification; Black was instructed to rework the figures on
the basis of an altered specification
which allowed greater use to be made of oil extracted from shale. Excluding
this, the greatest increase Black felt justified in allowing was still from
Persia on the basis that the APOC ‘before they get their fresh capital for
development, might in time of war divert about 70,000 tons of oil now sold to
other customers.’ The forecast was now for 25,000 tons of Persian oil per
month by 1917-18; Black was confident that war supplies would be obtainable
‘providing that a certain definite line of contract policy were adopted.’
But time was running out.
‘Daily the prices of oil are rising’, Churchill was warned by an
internal memorandum in March 1913, ‘and daily the supplies are becoming more
restricted through far-seeing users anticipating their requirements and getting
a lien on production.’ As an illustration of this unsettling prediction the
writer noted that, when appearing before Pakenham’s committee early in 1912,
Marcus Samuel had offered to supply, to Admiralty specification, a million tons
a year on a long contract; he had immediately been interrupted by Deterding who,
more cautiously, offered half a million tons. Now, in 1913, Deterding was
offering only 100,000 tons, and this to his
own specification, ‘the fact being that in the meantime prices have risen very
greatly and he has pledged all his oil supplies for years ahead.’ However, the
writer added somewhat acerbically, the Navy need have no fear of an oil famine
as long as it was prepared to pay the price for, when asked if he could
guarantee supply if price were no object, Deterding’s reply had been
commercially honest, if politically insensitive. ‘Absolutely,’ he had
declared. ‘It is entirely a question of price. If the Admiralty pays £4 or £5
a ton (taking a figure at random) you will always get supplies with no
difficulty.’
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