Armstrong’s,
who were building Sultan Osman, and
Vickers, building Reshadieh, had both
(according to Djemal) received gentle hints from the Admiralty as early as June
1914 that a delay in completion of the dreadnoughts would be judicious.
Sultan Osman, whose construction was
in a more advanced state, had actually steamed out of the Tyne on 7 July for the
long journey to the dry-dock at Devonport; she did not return till 22 July and
even then was still missing two of her 12-inch guns. Five days later the humble
Turkish transport carrying the Ottoman sailors tied up on the Tyne at the same
time as Admiral Limpus put to sea in execution of the plan to meet the
battleship in the Aegean and escort her safely through the Straits.
Although fractious at the delay Djemal at least believed he had got round the
problem of the missing guns: when in Paris on his abortive trip earlier in July
he had requested that Raouf Bey and Wassif Bey meet him. When they arrived Raouf
observed ‘that the English were in a very peculiar frame of mind. They seemed
to be always searching for some new excuse for delaying the completion and
delivery of our warship.’ Then, when informed by Armstrong’s that two of the
fourteen guns could not be mounted by the time previously agreed upon, Djemal
ordered Raouf to declare to Armstrong’s that the trials should proceed without
the two guns, which could be fitted later in Constantinople.
The Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, and the arrival of the
500 Turkish sailors at Newcastle, forced Churchill’s hand. On 28 July the
First Lord directed that ‘In case it may become necessary to acquire the two
Turkish battleships that are nearing completion…please formulate plans in
detail showing exactly the administrative action involved in their acquisition
and the prospective financial transactions. Also let me know the earliest dates
on which by concentrating work upon them they could be made available.’ The
Third Sea Lord, Admiral Moore, replied the following day that Sultan Osman, which had been due to leave for Constantinople on 16
August, could be obtained immediately while Reshadieh
would be in a fighting condition by the end of August. Churchill promptly
instructed that ‘The builders should by every means prevent and delay the
departure of these ships while the situation is strained and in no case should
they be allowed to leave without express permission. If necessary authority will
be given to restrain them. If war comes they can be taken over…’
With so many countries commissioning ships from British yards, it was not
the first time this subject had arisen. In May 1912 Lord Rothschild – in his
capacity as financial agent to the Chilean Government – had written to
Churchill when the Chileans placed a second order for a dreadnought that,
‘Quite apart from the advantage this large order is to the English Labour
Market, it must be self-evident to all that should unfortunately war break out
while ships of this calibre are being built or are near completion in English
shipyards, the English Government would in such untoward circumstances be able
to purchase these ships and thus replenish their Navy; that is, I believe, one
of the chief reasons why both the American and German Governments are anxious to
secure these contracts.’
Whether this argument had previously occurred to him or not, two months later
Churchill attempted to float this idea in the C.I.D. during the great debate on
Mediterranean requirements. In trying to reach an agreed basis for the new
Mediterranean standard the Admiralty had postulated, among other proposals, a 10
per cent. margin of strength over the Austrian fleet. On the basis of figures
supplied by Rear-Admiral Troubridge, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Churchill
ventured that such a standard was impossible ‘unless our shipyards were to
build for us exclusively or we were to acquire the vessels now building for
foreign Powers.’ There were four such battleships at the time and, although
the First Lord admitted that it would be impossible to find the 6,000 men
required to crew the ships, further discussion along this line was only brought
to a halt when Lord Haldane argued, pedantically, ‘that it would be very
undesirable to interfere in any way with them.’
Nevertheless, as the crisis developed in late July 1914, Admiral Sir
Arthur Wilson (the former First Sea Lord now recalled to the Admiralty in an
unofficial capacity) consulted the Foreign Office’s senior legal adviser for
an opinion which, inconveniently, was that the ships were unquestionably the
property of the Turkish Government even if not yet in commission and flying the
national flag. Further, there was no peacetime precedent for seizing a foreign
man of war. However, applying the flexibility that is the hallmark of the legal
mind, these considerations were set aside: ‘In time of war it is a question of
might and not of law and it becomes a question of policy whether to exercise the
arbitrary rights of belligerency.’ Wilson reported:
It
would seem that at the present time if action is desired it should take the form
of getting the builders to prevent by some means or other the ships being
commissioned. If it is desired to obtain them at once it should be by
negotiation with the Turkish Government. If
hostilities are imminent then it would become a question of taking forcible
possession of the ships, paying compensation and risking the result of such
action.
The
time factor was pushing Churchill in the direction of the last, drastic, option.
At the same time as Wilson was obtaining his legal opinion on Wednesday 29th the
Foreign Office informed the Admiralty that Grey had learned ‘from a reliable
source’ that Sultan Osman ‘is
being equipped with coal today and is under orders to proceed to Constantinople
as soon as possible, though still unfinished.’ To this unwelcome intelligence
Churchill minuted, ‘Tell FO. Measures have been adopted to prevent her leaving
or hoisting her Flag, the Law Officers being consulted.’
As if Grey’s information were not bad enough, Admiral Moore had independently
ascertained that the Turkish authorities were pressing Armstrong’s hard to
hoist the National flag on Saturday, 1 August — the Armstrong’s agent in
Constantinople had cabled that the Turks would find the final £800,000 of the
purchase price ‘today or tomorrow’ (30/31 July) and deposit it in a British
bank. At that point the game would be up as Armstrong’s would be ‘unable to
advance reasons for not hoisting the flag’ and, once that was done, ‘the
action of detaining the vessel may involve questions of very serious import.’
Unless some action was taken by Saturday 1 August the ship would depart with its
Turkish crew on the following Monday.
A further legal opinion had been obtained from the Attorney General’s
office on July 30 which included a draft letter addressed to Armstrong’s
prohibiting the transfer of the ship;
later that day, Churchill held a small conference in the Admiralty to discuss
the Attorney General’s memorandum. In the circumstances the decision was
almost a foregone conclusion — the ship should not be allowed to leave nor be
commissioned by the Turks. The Admiralty Secretary was sent to the Foreign
Office to see Nicolson, apprise him of the decision, ascertain whether Grey
approved and, if so, whether he would then inform the Turkish Ambassador.
Nicolson’s secretary returned to the Admiralty later with Grey’s answer: he
approved of the action, ‘but he considered that representations to the Turkish
Ambassador should not come first. The firm should, when they had no other means
of delaying action, inform the Turkish representatives of the decision of H. M.
Govt.’
Crowe’s advice was consistent with this approach: ‘I think we must let the
Admiralty deal with this question as they consider necessary’, he minuted,
‘and afterwards make such defence of our action to Turkey as we can.’
Whether Churchill viewed war with Turkey as inevitable, or whether he simply
viewed the ships as a necessary guarantee of superiority in the North Sea, at no
time does there appear to have been any discussion as to the effect which the
act of embargoing the ships would have on the Porte.
Churchill then called in the London representatives of Armstrong’s –
Sir Percy Girouard and Mr Saxton Noble – and informed them that Sultan Osman could not be commissioned or allowed to leave the Tyne.
‘This fact should be kept secret until the last moment’, warned Churchill,
‘and there was no reason why the money due should not be accepted. If Great
Britain should be at war the ship would be taken over by H. M. Govt.’
It had been an exhilarating day for the First Lord. Earlier, at 3.10 that
afternoon, he had personally drafted a dispatch to the C-in-C, Mediterranean,
urging him to bring to action, if possible, Goeben,
but to avoid being brought to action himself against superior forces. Now, after
midnight, in the quiet of the Admiralty, he wrote to the King:
…I
have taken the responsibility of forbidding the departure of the Turkish
battleship Osman (late Rio) with the Prime Minister’s approval. If war comes she will be
called – and shd Your Majesty approve – the Agincourt
& will convey Sir Henry Jackson to reinforce, & at the regular date
assume command of, the Mediterranean…
The
fact that Churchill seriously proposed to send the Turkish battleship out to the
Mediterranean when Mallet had lately been trying so assiduously to court the
Turks and where it might conceivably be engaged against the Ottoman navy,
displays an amazing lack of political acumen on the part of the First Lord;
still, Churchill could at least reflect that he had obtained two legal opinions
and had kept the Foreign Office fully informed. Whether the Turks would be
impressed by his moral punctiliousness was another matter.
Even here Churchill was taking no chances: Captain Power (the Captain
Superintendent of Contract Built ships on the Tyne) was notified on Friday, 31
July of the Admiralty decision, told to keep the Admiralty advised of any action
and take any steps necessary to prevent the ship leaving. ‘In connection with
this, you are authorised if requisite, to communicate with the police or with
the officer commanding the troops in the district should it be necessary in any
eventuality that force should be employed to give effect to these
instructions.’
Captain Power, who was further ordered to exercise great discretion and absolute
secrecy, replied by return that the Turkish crew aboard their transport, Neshid
Pasha, were said to be armed and, that early each morning, 400 of them went
on board Sultan Osman – ‘of course
without arms’ – and remained until sunset.
Saturday, 1 August loomed as the critical day: one of the remaining pair
of 12-inch guns was being hoisted aboard that morning
when, at midday, Captain Power received a call from Armstrong’s. Against the
advice of Finance Minister Djavid, ‘who foresaw what might happen’,
the final instalment was about to be paid and the Turks proposed to hoist the
National flag that afternoon. Power had two letters with him that he had
composed and addressed to Armstrong’s: both instructed the company not to hand
over the ship, while the second letter, in addition, threatened the use of force
against the Turks if necessary. Power gave both the letters to the company’s
representatives, and they all waited. At 2.30 p.m. word came through confirming
that the money had been deposited; there was now no time to lose. One of the
Armstrong’s directors immediately went aboard the ship, located Captain Raouf,
and invited him to the director’s private residence. ‘It was considered a
wiser, as well as more graceful act, to make this communication in private
rather than on board ship’, recorded Power. Raouf Bey was informed of the
situation by the directors and shown the first letter; lest there be any doubt,
Captain Power confirmed the Admiralty’s decision. ‘Raouf Bey took the matter
in the way we hoped’, reported Power, ‘though evidently he was deeply moved,
and he at once telephoned the Turkish Ambassador in London.’ Although the fate
of the ship had been the subject of local gossip for some days, Power had great
hopes that the news could be kept out of that evening’s newspaper, though it
must become known shortly. In conjunction with the local Officer Commanding
Troops, he had arranged for 100 Sherwood Foresters to be sent to the yard under
pretext of guarding the British super-dreadnought Malaya,
but in reality to prevent any trouble from the ‘thousand men armed with
rifles’ allegedly on the Turkish transport.
Following the telephone call from Raouf, Tewfik Pasha went immediately to
the Foreign Office where he saw Nicolson who had little option but to follow
Crowe’s advice from two days previously. In Nicolson’s report of meeting to
Grey, the Ambassador was informed that,
in
view of the serious situation abroad it was not possible to allow a battleship
to leave these waters and pass into the hands of a foreign buyer. Of course had
she been here on a visit it would have been different, but it was considered
that in the present tension it was not right to hand over to the buyer a newly
built battleship. The Admiralty had, I believed, taken possession temporarily of
her — as it would have been discourteous to have taken any steps once the
Turkish flag had been hoisted and a Turkish crew placed on board. The Ambassador
seemed puzzled — and said 3 million pounds had been paid for the ship. I told
him he would not lose the money. He asked for how long the ship would be
detained. I told him we were before the unknown & it was impossible to say.
Tewfik
was not the only distraught Ambassador who Nicolson had had to deal with that
afternoon: Paul Cambon had to be helped to a chair in Nicolson’s room after
Grey reported to him the Cabinet decision of that day that the B.E.F. would
remain where it was and the British fleet would not, for the moment, be
mobilized. How Nicolson must have wished he could have gone to Paris as
Ambassador, a posting he had been urging on Grey for some time! With the
outbreak of war Nicolson agreed to remain in his place; but that place had
become increasingly insular within the Foreign Office as Nicolson’s pessimism
and overt Russophilia had alienated him from both Grey and his senior officials.
In the coming weeks it would be the likes of Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir George
Clerk, together with Grey’s private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, who would
shoulder the immediate burden of the transition from peace to war.
For Nicolson, the cares and concerns of that day did not end with Tewfik’s
departure for, later that Saturday night, the news came through of the German
declaration of war against Russia.
As has been mentioned, Tewfik’s telegram to Constantinople reporting
the events on Tyneside would be used by Enver to quash any dissension amongst
the small group at Yeniköy in the early hours of Sunday, 2 August though, for
the time being, the news of the embargo would remain a closely guarded secret,
to be shared only by those present at the Grand Vizier’s villa. Having by this
means forced the issue – overruling in the process the protests of Djavid –
Enver was not about to sell his country to Germany at a knock-down price. With
the fact of the alignment conceded, the bargain remained to be struck.
Discussion at Yeniköy then turned to consideration of the price to be extracted
from Berlin for Turkey’s adherence to the Central Powers (as they now were
following the defection of Italy). The Turks would eventually put six proposals
to Wangenheim. First, to prevent Bulgaria and Roumania capitalizing on the
situation while the Turkish army was engaged against the Russians, Turkey would
only act after an agreement had been reached with her Balkan neighbours. Second,
Turkey counted on German support to abolish the despised Capitulations. Third,
Germany would not negotiate a separate peace while enemy forces still occupied
Ottoman territory. Fourth, if Greece sided with the Entente and was defeated,
Germany would guarantee the return of the Aegean Islands formerly in the
possession of Turkey. Fifth, Germany would undertake the responsibility of
redrawing the eastern boundary of the Ottoman Empire ‘in a manner suitable for
the establishment of a link with the Muslim peoples of Russia’. And last,
Germany would guarantee that, at the end of hostilities, Turkey would be
compensated fairly.
For Enver it had been a long, though productive, night. Yet, although the deal
with Germany was as good as done, Said Halim felt able mendaciously to reassure
the French Ambassador, whom he saw first thing on the morning of 2 August, that
Turkey intended to proclaim her neutrality.
In London the new day – Sunday 2 August – began for Asquith with an
emotional appeal from Lichnowsky at breakfast. Not one for scenes, Asquith wrote
that afternoon of the German Ambassador ‘He was very agitated poor man &
wept. I told him that we had no desire to intervene, and that it rested largely
with Germany to make intervention impossible, if she would (1) not invade
Belgium, and (2) not send her fleet into the Channel to attack the unprotected
North Coast of France.’ Then, at the first of the two Cabinets that day, it
was decided, only after vigorous argument and the threat of resignation, that
Grey be allowed to give a limited assurance to Cambon.
After Grey had done this when the Cabinet adjourned, Churchill saw the French
Naval Attaché in a preliminary meeting aimed at effectively co-ordinating
Anglo-French naval co-operation. Crowds began to gather in Downing Street
despite the intermittent heavy showers of rain one of which, to the unconcealed
delight of a spectator in the Admiralty building, ‘broke up the bloody
Socialists in Trafalgar Square.’ The anti-war meeting was a damp squib.
The Cabinet was due to reconvene at 6.30 p.m.; when it did it was agreed that a
substantial violation of Belgian neutrality would compel British intervention.
In the period during the adjournment of the two sittings of the Cabinet
that Sunday in London, Wangenheim in Constantinople obtained the signature of
the Grand Vizier on the treaty of alliance.
As soon as news of this reached Berlin the Admiralty staff were persuaded to
change their opinion regarding Goeben
and Breslau — the ships were directed to proceed to Constantinople
immediately.
It was now time for the Grand Vizier to begin playing his double game. Early on
the morning of Monday 3 August the Grand Vizier and Talaat saw Beaumont, the
British Chargé, and spoke to him ‘with some vexation’ on the subject of the
detention of the Turkish ship, ‘which’, Beaumont reported in a mild
understatement, ‘they seemed to consider an unfriendly act as Turkey is not at
war.’ Beaumont did his best to explain that the Admiralty was only exercising
the right of pre-emption which applied to all foreign ships building in England,
at which Talaat then referred to the usurious rate of interest (amounting to
20%) on the money borrowed to pay for the ship. ‘For the sake of our friendly
relations with this country’, the Chargé commented in his dispatch to Grey,
‘I hope due consideration will be given to this circumstance.’
Having thus made his feelings known about the British action, Said Halim then
complained to Wangenheim (who remained unaware of the embargo) that, although
Enver and Liman wanted to declare war on Russia immediately – which was the
hope in Berlin – he was against it as he feared that once Turkey had done so Sultan
Osman might be seized by the British! Citing further reasons against
precipitate Turkish action Said Halim also pointed out that Turkish mobilization
was not yet complete and that the attitude of Bulgaria remained unclear.
It would perhaps not be too cynical to suggest that, aware of the pressure being
applied on the Ambassador by his masters, Enver and Said Halim conspired in a
double act for Wangenheim’s benefit: for, while the eager Enver apparently
pushed for immediate Turkish action, which would make for an encouraging report
to Berlin, the circumspect Said Halim held out for ever greater concessions.
As with the Greek promises of aid to the Entente, the direction that the
Bulgarians might take assumed paramount importance during this first week in
August. As early as 30 July the German Chargé in Athens reported that Bulgaria
had declared neutrality
yet both Venizelos in Athens and Said Halim in Constantinople, by ignoring this,
could use the fear of Bulgarian intervention either to limit the extent of their
own commitment or extract the maximum concessions from their respective suitors.
The first indication of the way Turkey might lean reached London on the morning
of Monday 3rd after the British Military Attaché at the Embassy reported ‘on
good authority’ that orders had been issued by the Turkish authorities for an
immediate general mobilization. Cunliffe-Owen also reported details of a meeting
of the German Military Mission at which it was decided that the members of the
Mission would remain in Turkey, with some officers taking up active posts in the
field army ‘forthwith’. ‘I believe’, he concluded, ‘that efforts are
being made to bring Turkey to the side of the Triple Alliance, and Minister of
War and majority of officers incline to this view.’
Commenting on this Beaumont, who had already reported the Grand
Vizier’s reassuring message to the French Ambassador regarding the supposedly
impending proclamation of Turkish neutrality, believed that the retention of the
German Mission and the mobilization ‘would seem to be both unwise and
unnecessary.’ This was particularly so as the Russians had declared every
intention of remaining on friendly terms with Turkey and would not raise the
question of the Straits.
As those in London struggled to make some sense of the often conflicting
intelligence being received, George Clerk, in the Eastern Department at the
Foreign Office, surmised that it now looked like Turkey and Bulgaria against
Serbia and Greece, while Roumania (as she had done in the First Balkan War)
again waited in the wings to see how she could profit by the internecine
squabbles of her neighbours. Eyre Crowe, upon whose counsels Grey had begun to
lean more heavily, appeared to accept that the Germans had already done their
job at the Porte; that there was little hope of attaching Turkey to the Entente;
and that the best that could be made of the situation was to try to lessen the
help Turkey could provide to Germany. To this end he minuted, ‘I think an
effort should at least be made to secure Turkish neutrality.’
Crowe thereupon prepared a draft telegram to Beaumont which was approved by Grey
and dispatched on 4 August:
You
should earnestly impress upon Grand Vizier that Turkish interest would best be
served by maintaining a strict neutrality. If Turkey were to be drawn into the
war as an ally of Germany and Austria the gravest consequences would follow. You
must, however, be careful to avoid anything to give rise to impression that we
are threatening.
Before
it was dispatched, Crowe’s draft was also sent to the Admiralty on Monday 3
August, and was seen and initialled by Rear-Admiral Oliver, the Director of
Naval Intelligence.
Confirmation of Crowe’s fears regarding Turkey also arrived on Monday
from the astute Sir Henry Bax-Ironside in Sophia: a Greek colleague, resident in
Constantinople for 25 years, had informed him ‘from sure source that German
Government are using all their influence to persuade Ottoman Government to join
force with Triple Alliance and attack Russia on Asiatic frontier.’ As a
result, Clerk now believed that the three Entente Ambassadors should be
instructed to use all their efforts to counter-act German pressure, warning the
Porte again of the danger of abandoning neutrality.
Lending added urgency to what appeared to be a rapidly deteriorating situation,
Rodd reported from Rome – where the Italians had declared neutrality – that
the Italian Foreign Minister, having heard of the Turkish mobilization on the
2nd, ‘saw the hand of Germany, who hoped for an attack on the Eastern
provinces of Russia.’
Indeed, the only faint glimmer of hope came from St Petersburg where it was
thought the Austrians might try to restrain Turkey and Bulgaria from attacking
Serbia for fear of bringing in the Roumanians against themselves.
No such restraint was forthcoming from Germany. Jagow urgently
telegraphed Wangenheim on the evening of the 4th that Britain was likely to
declare war on Germany ‘as early as today or tomorrow’. Fearing that the
Porte may, influenced by this British action, try ‘escaping from us at the
last moment’ Jagow warned that Turkey’s declaration of war against Russia
‘today, if possible, would appear to be of the greatest importance.’
This was, however, the furthest thing from the mind of the Grand Vizier.
Jagow’s insistent telegram crossed with two from Wangenheim: the first,
continuing to highlight Said Halim’s fears concerning Bulgaria, now sought to
link those fears to the attitude of Roumania. If this were not bad enough the
second telegram must have caused something of a panic in Berlin. It was the old
story — Enver, apparently straining at the bit, was trying to initiate action
despite the pragmatism of Said Halim. ‘Enver lets me know’, Wangenheim wired
at 6 p.m. on Tuesday 4 August, ‘that the military authorities at the
Dardanelles have been instructed to let Austrian and German war-ships enter the
Straits without hindrance. Grand Vizier fears, however, that if use is made of
this privilege before the relations with Bulgaria have been settled, an
acceleration of developments not desired at the present time by Germany or
Turkey might be the result.’
This was particularly unsettling news for the German Admiralty who had not
wanted to spare Goeben at first, and had only relented after the news of the
alliance was received; nevertheless, the melancholy advice was flashed to
Admiral Souchon aboard his flagship that, for political reasons, it was not
possible to put into Constantinople for the present.
It was now time for Said Halim to strike his bargain. With the Straits
apparently barred, the Grand Vizier notified Wangenheim that, although the
Cabinet had now decided to allow in the German ships, would Wangenheim care to
consider the six points that had been formulated at the Yeniköy meeting? The
Ambassador was trapped, and he knew it. A refusal to admit the six points might
see the Straits barred again and Souchon’s squadron thereby thrown to the
British. This he could not afford to do — the arrival of Goeben
and Breslau would, he bargained, be a
clear indication that the Turks had pitched their tent in the same camp as the
Germans and would thereby leave the Turks little option but to enter the war
directly.
Wangenheim agreed to accept the conditions, justifying his action to Berlin on
the grounds that Turkey could only call in the promises if the Central Powers
won the war decisively.
In other words, Germany had nothing to lose: the spoils of victory would be more
than enough to satiate her satellites, while defeat, if not quite unthinkable,
would see the allies go down together. What Wangenheim did not know as Said
Halim played his game was that Souchon, short on alternatives after it had
become apparent that the Austrian navy was not going to assist him, had ignored
the warning from Berlin and intended to steam for Constantinople in any
circumstances.
In
the first of two reports which reached London on Tuesday 4th from
Constantinople, Beaumont informed Grey that the Russian Ambassador was
attempting to calm the nerves of the Grand Vizier regarding fears –
‘evidently inspired by the Triple Alliance Ambassadors’ – that Russia
might launch a coup de main against
the Straits. ‘In view…of the evident wish of Germany and Austria-Hungary to
have Turkey on their side’, Beaumont suggested, ‘it would be well to point
out to Turkish Ambassador risk which Turkey will run by throwing in her lot with
the Triple Alliance.’
However this advice was, to some extent, undermined by the second dispatch –
written after Beaumont had seen Said Halim once more – when the Grand Vizier
again renewed his assurance that Turkey would observe strict neutrality.
Swallowing the line he was fed, Beaumont now reported ‘Mobilisation had been
decided upon only because it would take months to complete and because
Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bulgaria,
though they had also been alarmed by rumours of action by Russia —
attributable, I think, to German Ambassador.’
Although he could give no guarantee regarding Bulgarian action, Grey quickly
reassured the Turkish Government that the Russians did not contemplate forcing
the Straits which must, at all costs, remain open to merchant vessels. Russia,
the Foreign Secretary confided somewhat elastically, had ‘not in the last five
years said anything to us about passage of warships through Straits.’
The situation, then, remained thoroughly confused in London on the
evening of the 4th as the minutes before the deadline set for a German response
to the British ultimatum ticked away. Every indication that Turkey would
participate actively in the war, either attacking through Thrace or on the
Russian frontier, was countered by the soothing noises emanating from the Grand
Vizier. Similarly, although the information received in the Admiralty was less
detailed than that pouring into the Foreign Office, the intelligence it was
obtaining was sending conflicting signals. On Sunday 2nd, the Admiralty had
learned from the Greek Government that the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople
had been inquiring as to the quantity of coal at Salonica, thereby raising the
spectre of the Austrian fleet conducting a sortie from the Adriatic, to attempt
to disrupt the Serbian war effort and, possibly, with the ultimate intention of
making for the Black Sea to engage the Russian fleet.
Then, late that afternoon, a report was received from the Dardanelles that a
Turkish minelayer had left the Bosphorus carrying 50 mines; confirmation that at
least 22 of these mines had been used to close the Dardanelles was received
early on the morning of the 5th.
As mines do not differentiate between the nationality of ships
it was reasonable to assume that this act was defensive rather than offensive,
which tended to confirm the belief that, at least for the time being, Turkey
would remain neutral. Admiral Milne was warned on the 5th that mines were being
laid in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and the light extinguished, though, when
a more detailed report was received from the Lloyds’ agent at the Dardanelles
the following day, the Admiralty did not think it necessary to pass this on to
Milne ‘at present’.
After the time limit for the ultimatum to Germany had expired hopes were
raised on 5 August that Britain’s entry into the war might deter Turkey from
taking action. By the following day, this fragile aspiration should have been
dashed by a series of reports that left little or no doubt as to the situation
prevailing at the Porte. For a start, Eyre Crowe was visited on the morning of
the 6th by Sir Charles Ottley who, having left the secretariat of the C.I.D.,
was now a director of Armstrong’s with contacts in Constantinople, foremost of
whom was Captain Harry Vere who was there supervising the reconstruction of the
docks. In case Ottley had not made his point during the conversation, he sent
Crowe a letter later that day to underline precisely what was being reported
back to him from Constantinople:
Enver
Bey and a considerable section of the Turkish public are in favour of joining
the Austro-German alliance, and are using the fact that we have seized the two
Turkish Dreadnoughts as an appeal to popular animosity against England. If –
as is rumoured – Italy now joins England, our Turkish friends tell us that
this will be represented as a plain indication that there is an anti-Mussulman
crusade on foot. Should this idea gain headway at Constantinople the effect
might be to turn the scale and bring Turkey into belligerency against us. Merely
to inform the Turkish Government by diplomatic channels of the friendliness of
our intentions is therefore (say our friends) not enough…What is wanted [is]
to get into the Turkish press a statement that England is friendly to
Turkey. This may be an impossible procedure, and again it may be quite needless.
But of course it is clear that if the bellicose party is in the ascendant in the
Turkish Cabinet, our friendly diplomatic messages may be suppressed by the
Porte, and may never reach the Turkish people…
After
the meeting there then followed a further two telegrams from Beaumont, received
between 10.15 and 10.55 a.m. In the first, having informed the Grand Vizier of
Grey’s message that the Government had but little choice other than to
pre-empt both Turkish battleships, Beaumont, who now found that Said Halim was
more irritated than two days before, hoped that the promise of financial
compensation offered by Grey would be quickly forthcoming. Somewhat unkindly,
the Chargé reported that the Grand Vizier displayed ‘almost childish
disappointment’ at losing both ships and, in a breathtaking understatement,
Beaumont commented that ‘Payment of a certain sum down would relieve the
slight tension caused by the incident.’
This was certainly not the general impression felt at the Embassy where Ryan,
the dragoman, wrote of the pre-emption as having ‘most unfortunate
repercussions at our end’ resulting in many private protests streaming into
the Embassy ‘including one from a poor man who attached a Turkish halfpenny to
his letter in case Britain should be so impoverished that they could do nothing
better than steal ships bought with hard-earned Turkish money.’
The second of Beaumont’s telegrams contained a report from the Military
Attaché, Cunliffe-Owen, for the attention of the Director of Military
Operations which went far towards clearing up any doubts that Turkey’s alleged
‘neutrality’ was in fact to be armed and not disinterested. ‘Mobilisation
is proceeding vigorously’, noted Cunliffe-Owen, ‘but with opposition in
certain localities, and with much hardship to the population in regard to
requisitioning. There are signs of a concentration of troops eventually in
Thrace, but it is not clear yet what action Turkey might take. German Officers
are to become Ottoman subjects, and Marshal Liman von Sanders is to take up the
executive command at Adrianople of an army assembled there.’
The fourth warning that day came from a third separate source and was the
most conclusive of all. William Erskine, the Chargé d’Affaires in Athens,
reported that ‘Indications have recently reached Greek Government from several
sources that Germany is pressing Turkey to make common cause with her, and M
Venizelos told me this morning [5 August] that Greek Minister in Berlin had just
learnt from Government circles that
military convention has now been concluded with Turkey.’ Venizelos was, in
fact, fully aware of the Turco-German alliance
but, for reasons of his own, chose not to reveal to Erskine the full extent of
his knowledge; just the reverse, for complex motives (discussed separately) the
Greek Premier intentionally tried to destroy the credibility of the report from
Berlin by confiding in Erskine that he did not see what inducements Germany
could offer to Turkey to enter the war, except at the expense of Greece and that
it was his opinion that the Greek Minister in Berlin ‘may have been
deliberately misled by German Government as to convention in order to frighten
Greece into compliance with their wishes.’
Although Venizelos had attempted to muddy the waters, this was another
indication that Turkey was adopting a forward policy; the cable was seen by
Crowe, Clerk, Nicolson and Grey. Further, when Crowe saw the Greek Minister in
London that day Gennadius had warned him ‘that the military party at
Constantinople was talking a good deal about reconquering Egypt for Turkey.’
While all this information was of a certain academic interest to the Foreign
Office, it would have been of immense practical value to the Admiralty as the
drama of Goeben and Breslau was
unfolding.
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