The
Anglo-French convention of 6 August 1914 had given the French theoretical
command of operations in the Mediterranean. By late December (once the naval
situation there had settled down to blockading the Straits of Otranto and the
Dardanelles, combined with operations on the coast of Asia Minor) the French
proposed a division of labour whereby the forces from the Dardanelles down the
coast to Syria should be controlled by a French Vice-Admiral, with the possible
assistance of a British Rear-Admiral, while the Red Sea and coast of Egypt would
be commanded by a British Vice-Admiral aided by a French Rear-Admiral if
desired. However Churchill refused to relinquish British control at the
Dardanelles, minuting as such on 30 December, and the French proposal lapsed.
This was at the same time that Churchill became aware of Hankey’s memorandum
and had declared to Asquith that he had wanted Gallipoli attacked on the Turkish
declaration of war.
Nothing then happened until, three days after the naval expedition had
been authorized in the War Council on 13 January, Churchill informed the French
Naval Attaché, the Comte de Saint-Seine, that:
The
British Government find it necessary to take offensive action against Turkey in
the near future. The Admiralty have in consequence decided to attack the
Dardanelles forts, and force, if possible, a passage into the Sea of Marmora. It
is proposed to achieve this by a gradual and methodical reduction of the forts
by naval bombardment…The scheme of these operations has been prepared by
Vice-Admiral Carden, now commanding the Allied fleets at the Dardanelles.
The Admiralty do not wish, in view of this very important operation, that
any change in the local command in that portion of the Mediterranean should be
made at the present time. They hope, however, that the squadron of French
battleships together with the French submarines and destroyers and the seaplane
ship Foudre, will co-operate under a
French Rear-Admiral…’
Saint-Seine
was also notified of a War Office plan to occupy Alexandretta in February.
Somehow, Churchill had to find a way to pre-empt French claims to control the
Dardanelles operations on the basis of the August 1914 convention. He attempted
to do this by maintaining that the convention applied only to war with Austria
and Germany. ‘The entry of Turkey into the war’, he declared, ‘confronts
the Allies with new dangers and an entirely different situation in the eastern
basin of the Mediterranean. The spheres of activity of the two navies require
some further definition with a view to the energetic prosecution of the war, but
the Admiralty still consider that agreeably with those spheres of activity the
general direction of the operations should belong to France.’
To sugar the pill Churchill asked the French to provide a squadron to watch the
whole Syrian coast.
The First Lord successfully mollified Saint-Seine and Ambassador Cambon,
but not the French Minister of Marine, Victor Augagneur, who replied to the
Naval Attaché five days later that France alone must prepare and plan all
naval operations in the Mediterranean. Saint-Seine, supported by Cambon,
initially refused to deliver this letter until pressed by Augagneur.
Churchill’s reaction to this French rebuff, only days before the decisive War
Council, is not hard to imagine. As his conversion to the Dardanelles scheme and
subsequent proselytizing activities in support of it now stood in jeopardy, he
immediately enlisted Grey’s support: while Beatty’s ships clashed with the
Germans at the Dogger Bank on Sunday 24 January Churchill wrote to Grey
describing Augagneur’s letter as ‘a very unpleasant & unfair reply to my
communication.’ The August convention was merely, Churchill tendentiously
maintained,
a
working arrangement dealing with conditions which existed at the beginning of
the war. It is obviously capable of being modified or cancelled on both sides at
any time. It could not have any bearing upon the new conditions created by the
entry of Turkey into the war. It is absurd for the French to claim that
henceforward we are to make no movement in the Mediterranean except by their
directions & under their command. That would be to inflict on Gt
Britain…conditions which could not be extorted from her by any power by war.
The French ships placed under our direction have done little or nothing in the
Channel & foreign waters, & we are ready to release them at any time.
The French Fleet moreover has itself done nothing in the Mediterranean. We are
quite capable of conducting the Dardanelles operation without any assistance,
& I only suggested the French co-operation out of loyalty and politeness. It
is curious that on Nov 21st we asked the French to release our battle cruisers
& to relieve our Admiral off the Dardanelles, in order that we might use all
our force to catch Admiral von Spee’s Squadron. They declined however, &
begged us to leave our ships & retain the command. This we did, tho’ under
some strain. Now the outer seas are clear, & we have ample forces available.
All plans for the attack on the Dardanelles are moving forward, & I have
every expectation of opening fire on the 15th [February]. I hope I may count on
you to see me through with these people…
At
Cambon’s urging, Augagneur decided to come to London, where he would arrive on
Tuesday 26 January. The French Minister of Marine was, however, careful to seek
and receive his own Cabinet’s sanction for the meeting with Churchill.
Although upsetting, the French position was not entirely unforeseen as, on the
day before Augagneur’s dispiriting
reply was received, Churchill had given orders that should Carden (a
Vice-Admiral) have to absent himself from the Dardanelles for any reason, his
second in command, de Robeck, should be made a temporary Vice-Admiral. ‘It is
imperative’, Churchill instructed Fisher and Oliver, ‘that we should
continually retain a battle cruiser & a V[ice] A[dmiral] off the
D[ardane]lles. I cannot run the risk of
the French obtaining command.’
Augagneur’s visit represented the second line of attack for the French
as, on 21 January, the War Minister, Millerand, had travelled to London to plead
General Joffre’s case. Joffre had interrogated Sir John French as soon as the
latter returned from attending the War Council on 8 January to ascertain the
extent to which the promised British reinforcements would allow Sir John to
assist him. Joffre cared nothing for the Zeebrugge operation; instead, he
argued, all available British troops should be poured into the Northern sector
to relieve completely the French troops there, allowing thereby the
strengthening of the French line elsewhere, and leading to a ‘possible
offensive movement’.
At a dinner given by Kitchener on 22 January, attended by Asquith, Grey, and
Lloyd George with Millerand as the guest of honour, Asquith was generally
pleased with the result of the discussions: it was all to the good to have these
personal interchanges, he declared, as they ‘obviate friction, and grease the
sometimes rather creaking wheels of the Entente.’ Asquith pressed the Balkan
situation strongly, as did, after dinner, Grey and Lloyd George (the latter,
Asquith gleefully noted, having to conduct his conversation through an
interpreter as Millerand spoke no English).
Within two days Asquith was having second thoughts. Lloyd George it
transpired, violently pro-Serb, had had a ‘rather stormy’ interview with
Millerand and Asquith ruefully admitted that it was ‘quite possible as a
result of Millerand’s mission that we may have a bit of a row with the
French.’
Millerand was later taken, in vile winter weather, to inspect the new Kitchener
armies and was suitably impressed even if he continued to resist Kitchener’s
favoured proposal for an advance from Salonica; nevertheless, Kitchener appeared
to extract a promise from Millerand that the French General Staff would at least
study the proposal. However, once back safely in the confines of the French
Embassy, in a room ‘dreary enough to suit his austerities, with nothing
provided for his entertainment but an old copy of the Revue
des Deux Mondes, M Millerand resisted all attempts to lure him to sanction
strategical plans which he made pretence of inability to grasp.’ In this
endeavour he was ably assisted by Cambon who, despite twenty years residence in
London, now professed himself unable to speak or understand English!
By the evening of the 26th though, an arrangement had been agreed upon with
Joffre for a ‘rearrangement’ of troops on the Western front which would give
the British the whole of the extreme left flank; this manoeuvre was due to be
completed by early March.
On the same day Churchill dealt with Augagneur, having a long discussion
with him that morning, after which he reported to Grey and Kitchener that, as a
result:
…There
would be no difficulty in arriving at agreement on the following lines:—
1)
The British to have the command at the Dardanelles & to undertake the
operation at their discretion. The French sqn. there will cooperate, but the
extent of its cooperation will be defined after the French naval authorities
have examined the general plan.
2)
The British Vice Admiral will continue to command in Egypt, but a French
VA will command in the Levant, not only as I had proposed from Latakia to Jaffa,
but including Alexandretta. Any military operation on the Levantine coast shd be
made a subject of discussion between the two govts. & the French wish to
participate in any occupation of Alexandretta…
Churchill
knew that, without entering into specifics, he could safely give an equivocal
pledge regarding Alexandretta, as he had already been told by Kitchener that it
was now impossible to set a precise date for the Alexandretta expedition —
this hesitancy being the result of an intelligence report received on 25 January
that elements of the Turkish Army had been observed within twelve miles of Suez.
Churchill urged that both Grey and Kitchener should also talk to Augagneur. Yet
Grey, who was to dine with the Minister the following night, Wednesday 27
January, had some misgivings about Churchill’s prevarication with regard to
Alexandretta:
I
think it important to let the French have what they want in this Memo even about
Alexandretta. It will be fatal to cordial cooperation in the Mediterranean &
perhaps elsewhere if we arouse their suspicions as to anything in the region of
Syria. I hope you will close with this proposal. If it is not agreed to I
foresee very untoward consequences…
Churchill
confirmed the gist of the conversation to Augagneur on the 27th, adding that a
pronounced French offensive in the Adriatic would greatly benefit the general
political situation in the Balkans. By giving the French something to keep them
occupied in the Adriatic, Churchill was hoping thus to deal himself a free hand
at the Dardanelles.
Augagneur left London a convert; for this he was, subsequently, severely
criticized. It was alleged that he had succumbed to Churchill’s magnetic charm
and oratorical skill, even though the medium might have been the First Lord’s
execrable French.
However, given the relative strengths of the Allies at sea, there was little
else Augagneur could do but agree — as he later admitted before a French
commission:
Not
to take part in the operation would be to see, should it succeed, the British
fleet present itself alone before Constantinople. For we French, who have known
stakes in the Near East, it would have been a very painful renunciation,
perilous for our interests. We therefore decided that we would send 4 old
battleships to be part of the game, without, however, engaging ourselves.
Moreover
Augagneur, like many others, had fallen for the seductive line of reasoning
that, if unsuccessful, the attack could always be broken off without the
impression being given that a reverse had been sustained. Confirmation of French
willingness to assume a subservient rôle was not received until a few days
after the Minister’s visit; nevertheless, on the eve of the vital War Council
of 28 January, and the confrontation with Fisher and Asquith that was to precede
it, Churchill knew that the French challenge to his Dardanelles hegemony had
been successfully met and rebuffed.
The
Russians also had to be dealt with. It was not until 18 January that Churchill
considered the time appropriate for a reply to be made to Grand Duke
Nicholas’s appeal; and he was careful to suggest to Grey that the answer
should go through the Russian Naval Attaché rather than via the diplomatic
channel. Secrecy was vital, he enjoined, as, not knowing the degree of
resistance that the Turkish forts might offer, ‘it is most undesirable that
the full scope of the operation should become known beforehand.’ The message
went off on the evening of 19 January; the Grand Duke was apprised that the
Admiralty, having considered the request for naval action against Turkey,
‘have decided that the general interests of the Allied cause require a serious
effort to be made to break down Turkish opposition…It has therefore been
decided to attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles by naval force.’
Churchill thought the operation would take three or four weeks and would be
similar in character ‘to the method by which the Germans destroyed seriatim
the forts of the outer line at Antwerp.’ Although the First Lord hoped the
Russians would co-operate ‘powerfully’ at the proper moment, by a
combination of naval action at the mouth of the Bosphorus and by having troops
poised to seize any advantage, he cautioned that:
It
would probably be better to defer Russian action until the outer forts of the
Dardanelles have been destroyed, so that if failure should occur at the outset,
it will not have the appearance of a serious reverse. But it is our intention to
press the matter to a conclusion, & at the right moment the intervention of
the Russian Fleet will be most desirable.
Rather than deferring action, the Russians were shocked to find that they
were to be required at all! General Hanbury Williams had a long interview with
the Grand Duke on 24 January only to be informed that the Russian position in
the Caucasus had already been considerably eased due to Russian exertions and
Enver’s bungling while the Grand Duke:
laid
stress on the fact that he had made no suggestion as to the methods we should
employ in rendering assistance to draw off the Turks from that theatre, and had
never guaranteed any Russian co-operation, glad as they would be of course to
give it should opportunity occur. The Russian General Staff pointed out that
their Black Sea Fleet, in view of the delay in building of their dreadnoughts,
of the scarcity of their destroyers, and of the lack of ‘up-to-date’
submarines, was only the equal of the Turkish Fleet (including, of course, Goeben and Breslau). Even,
they added, that equality would only be reached when all the units could work
together, and the absence of one or two of them would at once place the balance
in favour of the Turks. The construction of their ships was such that they could
only carry a four days’ supply of coal…However much they wished to
co-operate with the British Fleet, their hands were tied.
Military
co-operation was also out of the question as this could only be done at the
expense of depriving Russian forces from other theatres. Still, the Grand Duke
declared, Allied action against Turkey was of the utmost importance and although
he could promise neither naval nor military support he would ‘naturally use
every endeavour, should opportunity present itself, to strengthen the hands of
the Allies.’
Buchanan passed this gloomy appraisal on to London on the 25th: even were
the Straits to be forced, the Russians were in no position to land troops as
these could not be spared. Churchill received a copy of the Russian reply on the
26th, the same day as his interview with Augagneur. In an accompanying minute
Grey warned Churchill against communicating the text of the Russian reply to
Augagneur as the importance the Russians attached to the operation might be used
by the Frenchman ‘to show that we must go ahead with it & that failure to
do so will disappoint Russia & react most unfavourably upon the military
situation, about which France & we are specially concerned just now.’ What
Grey was seeking to prevent by employing this convoluted reasoning is unclear
for Churchill’s meeting with Augagneur concerned less whether the operation
would take place but more who would control it. For good measure Grey added that
the Grand Duke disliked his ‘military information’ being given even to his
own Russian Ministers, let alone Ministers of foreign countries!
Not even Sazonov was admitted into the secret, while the Russian Ambassador in
London only became aware of the impending attack after being told by the French
in February. As Benckendorff, upon learning of this, was ‘anxious’ that
Sazonov also be informed, Grey wired Buchanan on 11 February with instructions
to tell the Russian Foreign Minister ‘very confidentially’ of the serious
attempt that would be made to force the Straits and that Russian co-operation
had been invited ‘some time ago’.
So, by 27 January (the day before the War Council), Churchill had squared
the French and knew the Russians would take no active part; the only obstacle
that remained now was Fisher. There is some evidence that, at this time,
Churchill tried to buy Fisher off with the promise of building the ludicrous,
shallow draught battle cruisers that Fisher wished to operate in the Baltic.
If so, Churchill was being doubly irresponsible. What is certain is that Fisher
informed the Director of Naval Construction that, although he ‘had a fierce
time with the First Lord – Very
fierce!’, he had succeeded in obtaining approval for the two ships ‘if only
we can make a good story for the Cabinet.’ To sell the ships successfully to
his Cabinet colleagues Fisher warned the D.N.C. that they would have to be ready
to fight within a year; that the cost must be held down; and that it must be
stated that the construction of the two ships was demanded by the shipyards and
could be undertaken by them ‘without interfering with current government
work.’ Fisher laid great stress on the shallow draught of the two vessels as
this was ‘vital for Baltic work’ and it was ‘on the Baltic undertaking
that [Churchill] will carry them through in the Cabinet.’
As mentioned, both Fisher and Churchill had been commanded by Asquith to
appear for an audience at 11.10 a.m. on 28 January, twenty minutes before the
War Council was scheduled to convene. As that Thursday dawned Fisher was, as
usual, feverishly busy at the Admiralty dashing off the first of two letters;
Churchill was the recipient. Fisher now proposed to disappear gracefully and
cultivate roses at Richmond, for he had a new worry: the Battle of the Dogger
Bank! Far from being assuaged by Churchill’s contention that the five to four
superiority in battle cruisers on the day was ‘decisive’, Fisher was now
thoroughly alarmed by a (supposedly) unsolicited message from Jellicoe that the
action in fact demonstrated ‘very conclusively’ the absolute necessity for a
big preponderance of battle cruisers.
Jellicoe, and therefore Fisher, was against any diversion of “Queen
Elizabeth’s” or battle cruisers from the decisive theatre. In notifying
Churchill of his intention to refuse to attend the War Council, Fisher made his
position clear:
I
make no objection to either Zeebrugge or Dardanelles if accompanied by military
cooperation on such a scale as will permanently hold the Belgian coast to the
Dutch Frontier and our permanent military occupation of the Dardanelles Forts
pari passu with the Naval bombardment. Simultaneous Military & Naval
actions but no drain thereby on Grand Fleet Margin so therefore no
modern vessels at Dardanelles...
Fisher’s second letter was to Asquith, to be delivered by Hankey. In
it, Fisher restated his position and, perhaps for the moment forgetting how she
came to be there, laid particular emphasis on ‘our largest and most valuable
battleship, the Queen Elizabeth, with
the only 15-inch guns ready at present’ being at the Dardanelles instead of
the North Sea! ‘I am not in accord with the First Lord’, he declared
forthrightly to Asquith, ‘but, DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE SEEMLY TO SAY SO
BEFORE THE WAR COUNCIL.’
Fisher ended, forlornly, ‘No risks can be taken’ — a sad epitaph for the
Admiral. Before this internecine squabble had a chance to spill over into the
War Council, Churchill attempted to gloss over the grievance, by replying to his
truculent First Sea Lord that he would still far rather work with him than
Sturdee, who would be forced on Churchill ‘in the eventuality of which you
[Fisher] write so light-heartedly.’ Besides, Churchill complained (and not
without substance), ‘You have assented to both the operations in question
& so far as I am concerned there can be no withdrawal without good reason
for measures which are necessary, & for which preparations are far
advanced.’
As arranged, Churchill and Fisher met Asquith in the Prime Minister’s
room at No. 10. Churchill later maintained (in which belief he was backed up by
the Dardanelles Commissioners) that, although a written record was not kept, the
recollections of Asquith and Fisher as to what was discussed tallied. Churchill
wanted both the Zeebrugge and Dardanelles operations to go forward, but if one
had to be sacrificed it should be the former to which, he believed, Fisher was
the more violently opposed. Fisher, apparently, led Asquith to believe that his
objection to the Dardanelles operation rested not upon purely technical grounds
but simply because he favoured the Baltic scheme. In any event, in the short
time available to them, Asquith, inevitably, proposed a compromise by which
‘Winston was to give up for the present his bombardment of Zeebrugge, Fisher
withdrawing his opposition to the operation against the Dardanelles.’
According to Churchill, Fisher ‘seemed on the whole content’ and they went
downstairs to where the other members of the War Council were waiting, with
Churchill ‘under the impression that all was well.’
The meeting began by covering a number of topics, including the attempted
Turkish assault on the Suez Canal; it was only as the session was nearing its
close that the question of the Dardanelles was raised. Churchill first alluded
to the ‘enthusiastic’ reply of the Grand Duke and to the favourable response
and promised co-operation of the French! Having laid this exaggerated
groundwork, Churchill then asked ‘if the War Council attached importance to
this operation, which undoubtedly involved some risks?’ Fisher interrupted
immediately: he ‘had understood that this question would not be raised to-day.
The Prime Minister was well aware of his own views in regard to it.’
Fisher rose from the table. He made towards the door, intent, at last, on
resignation. Intuitively, and not without agility, Kitchener, who realized what
was about to happen, intercepted Fisher, pulled him to the window, and pointed
out to the First Sea Lord that he ‘was the only dissentient.’ It was only
upon this ‘urgent entreaty’ that Fisher consented to return to the table
where he consoled himself that, despite his personal misgivings, he could remain
in silence:
1.
because of the political importance of relieving Russia. 2. because in the first
instance the proposed plan was a tentative action which could be stopped at any
moment if unsuccessful…
When
discussion was resumed it was precisely this second point that Kitchener
emphasized, apparently unaware of the cardinal fallacy — an unsuccessful
attempt could not be broken off without handing the Turks a massive propaganda
coup.
When Kitchener had had his say, Balfour then took over, pointing out that
a successful attack would cut the Turkish army in two, put Constantinople under
allied control, allow Russia to resume wheat exports and open a passage to the
Danube. ‘It is difficult’, he concluded, ‘to imagine a more helpful
operation.’
Grey also joined in the general euphoria: the Turks, he prophesied, would be
‘paralyzed with fear’ when they realized the forts were being destroyed. So
unusual was it for either Balfour or Grey to become carried away in this manner
that Asquith specifically noted the fact: the proposal, he wrote that evening,
was ‘warmly supported’ by Grey and ‘enthusiastically’ by Balfour.
With Fisher silent, and Churchill obviously unwilling to volunteer such
information, none of the pitfalls of the operation was pointed out to the
non-military members. Indeed, it appears as if the dangers were played down;
this was certainly a factor as far as Balfour was concerned.
If
the naval views laid before the War Council be accepted, [Balfour noted] the
risk to the ships does not seem great; while the advantages of success –
military, political, and economical – would be enormous…These advantages are
far in excess of any which would be gained by the mere reduction of an ordinary
maritime base – like Zeebrugge. Nor do I think that the two operations should
be put in the same class. They belong to a different order of magnitude; and
even if the greater operation were more perilous than the smaller (& the
reverse appears to be the fact) some risk might well be run if there seemed a
reasonable prospect of obtaining its greater results. Let me incidentally remark
that the loss of a ship at the Dardanelles by a lucky shot ought not to involve
the loss of its crew. Assuming that the Admiralty are right in believing that
there is no risk from submarines the personnel of a sinking ship could surely be
rescued.
Although no formal decision was reached, the Dardanelles operation seemed
certain to be approved; Kitchener’s intervention and Balfour’s eloquence
being the deciding factors. Churchill now felt so confident of approval that he
ended the morning session by presenting a sketch of a possible campaign in the
Baltic which could be undertaken after
the Dardanelles and whose purpose, Hankey clearly saw, was to appease Fisher.
This Baltic operation, Churchill expounded, was ‘of great importance’ and
would require ‘special vessels’ which the First Sea Lord had designed.
Fisher instantly perked up: his two freak cruisers could be built in eleven
months if the usual formalities could be dispensed with, at which Lloyd George
helpfully announced that he would sanction the expenditure of £1 million
apiece.
Notwithstanding this last sop, Fisher maintained, in Asquith’s view, ‘an
obstinate and ominous silence’. The meeting adjourned for lunch. Fisher,
convinced that by speaking ‘so subtly of the Dardanelles Expedition that he
swayed all the rest of the War Council’, blamed Balfour and refused to dine
with him.
The fate of the Dardanelles operation was referred to a Sub-Committee
which would meet that afternoon at 4 o’clock in the War Office. Churchill, who
had ‘noticed the incident’ of Fisher leaving the table,
once more did not have long to act and, after lunch, called Fisher to his room
at the Admiralty where they had ‘a long talk’. Churchill ‘strongly urged
him not to turn back from the Dardanelles operation; and in the end, after a
long and very friendly discussion which covered the whole Admiralty and naval
position, he definitely consented to undertake it.’
One of the reasons adduced for Fisher’s compliance was the importance of the
other work he had in hand at the Admiralty, and it is reasonable to surmise that
a trade-off was effected: Fisher could have a free hand in the Baltic with his
new weapons in return for a grudging acceptance of the Dardanelles operation.
Why did Fisher not resign? The point was put to him at the Dardanelles
inquiry that, whether he ‘adopted the alternative of silence or the
alternative of resignation, how was the War Council to form any judgment at
all?’ Fisher replied that Churchill had been quite fair in stating the case
and admitting that ‘there were risks to be run’ while, from his point of
view, Fisher ‘did state that 12 battleships would be lost. I did see the Prime
Minister and put the case before him. The Council did know there was this strong
opinion of mine. In fact Hankey said to me, “Everybody noticed how greatly
moved and agitated you were”…’
According to Fisher:
I
was the only member of the War Council who dissented from the project, but I did
not carry through my dissent to the point of resignation because I understood
that there were overwhelming political reasons why the attempt at least should
be made…Mr Churchill knew my opinion. I did not think it would tend towards
good relations between the First Lord and myself nor to the smooth working of
the Board of Admiralty to raise objections to the War Council discussions. My
opinion being known to Mr Churchill in what I regarded as the proper
constitutional way, I preferred thereafter to remain silent.
This
is patently self-serving as, far from observing the ‘constitutional’
niceties at the time, after Asquith refused to circulate his dissenting
memorandum, Fisher privately distributed it — even the leader of the
opposition received a copy!
This does, however, raise the ancillary point that, besides Churchill at
the War Council, Asquith, Hankey and Kitchener were all clearly aware of
Fisher’s misgivings. ‘Was it wrong to put this pressure upon the First Sea
Lord?’ Churchill later asked rhetorically before providing the convenient
answer, ‘I cannot think so.’ Whatever passed between Churchill and Fisher on
the afternoon of 28 January, Fisher dropped his opposition; for this, Churchill
bears the responsibility. But the degree of responsibility differs according to
the motives for Fisher’s opposition: it was altogether too easy for Fisher to
maintain afterwards that this opposition rested solely upon his belief that only
a combined operation would succeed. Having pushed Churchill in the direction of
a naval attack on 3 January, Fisher had then developed cold feet at the prospect
of naval losses and the effect this would have on the balance in the North Sea;
these fears were played upon, none too subtly, by Jellicoe. Then, having been
responsible in the first place for the suggestion that Queen
Elizabeth should participate, Fisher soon became one of the strongest
opponents of her presence at the Dardanelles. Whatever he liked to spout
subsequently – along the lines of his oft-stated axiom that ‘any sailor who
attacked a fort was a fool’ – Fisher also believed that one point, at least,
in favour of attempting the operation, even if only as an experiment,
was the canard that it could be broken off at any time without loss of face.
Fisher was old and weary, and tired of constant arguments with Churchill.
As his opposition was not as clear cut as he subsequently made out, it was easy
for him therefore to succumb to Churchill that afternoon. Without being too
cynical, Fisher’s reluctant conversion to the Dardanelles also enabled him to
be in the position of later washing his hands if the attempt failed. Finally,
although it must remain a hypothesis, if he believed the attempt was doomed,
Fisher might have reasoned that failure would bring with it Churchill’s
downfall, leaving him in sole charge of the naval war. As Fisher argued a few
days’ later, ‘Our proper plan is to blockade Germany and the adjoining
neutral countries. That is the way to end the war. That is what Nelson would
have done. This war requires one man to manage it…’
It is also clear that Hankey believed ‘that in a trial of strength the First
Lord himself, and not Fisher, might be the victim.’
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