Following the acquisition by Greece of the armoured cruiser
Averoff the Turks upped the stakes with their order, in May 1911, for two
dreadnoughts from British yards, one from Vickers, the other from Armstrong.
Work on the Armstrong ship was suspended – never to be resumed – during the
Balkan Wars when Turkish funds dried up as the country appeared on the point of
collapse; work on the Vickers’ ship was temporarily halted also when the
builders demanded a better guarantee of payment but was later to proceed. A
disturbing new element was introduced when, in January 1913, Grey was informed
by the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Gerard Lowther, that the Turks
had made a conditional contract for the purchase of two Brazilian battleships
then being built in England.
There was, in fact, only one battleship – Rio de Janeiro – but, if true,
the purchase would decisively alter the naval balance in the Aegean: the Greek
battle cruiser Salamis, then being built in Germany, would be pitted
against the Turkish super-dreadnought Reschad V, still under construction
by Vickers in England and now, allegedly in addition, Rio de Janeiro.
While Battenberg though it ‘undesirable from every point of view’ that Greece
should have important units like Salamis he was also of opinion that the
Turkish navy was ‘hopeless’ and that the British naval mission there should be
withdrawn; given his close ties with the Royal family, it was little surprise
that he advocated that the mission to Greece, and his protégé Mark Kerr, should
remain in place as the rising sea power of Greece was ‘much more worthy’.
Although, on this occasion, Lowther’s report
would prove to be premature (the Brazilians had, as yet, shown no inclination to
sell) in the meantime, as neither Rio de Janeiro nor Reschad V
would be ready until the summer of 1914, Germany offered the Turks a further two
19 year old pre-dreadnoughts (Worth and Brandenburg) to add to the
pair of the same class the Turks had purchased in 1910 when concerned about
Greece’s acquisition of Averoff — Turkey looked like becoming a useful
repository for obsolete German weaponry. The head of the naval mission in
Constantinople at the time, Rear-Admiral Limpus, predicted to Churchill on 12
March 1913 that if the deal went through there would be a ‘much more decided
leaning towards Germany’ by the Turks and urged the British Government instead
to dispose of two of its old pre-dreadnoughts. Disagreeing with Battenberg,
Churchill condoned the suggestion and Limpus was informed on 3 April that the
Admiralty was prepared to sell two obsolete Royal Sovereigns but that,
unfortunately, nothing more modern was available. Unsurprisingly, the Turks were
less than enthusiastic and nothing more came of the proposal.
Ambassador Lowther, tired and cynical and
nearing the end of his five year spell at the Porte (T. E. Lawrence referred to
him as an ‘utter dud’), wearily reported to Sir Arthur Nicolson on the day after
Limpus’ warning to Churchill that:
The Turks great idea is to buy ships once peace is declared
for they realise that it is the intention of the Powers to deprive them of the
islands and they will want to take them back. It seems to me a silly idea to buy
two antiquated Germans but Limpus rather approves as they cannot buy anything
good. The worst of it is, if the Navy here is to be full of German ships, our
argument that the officers should be English falls to the ground…
Apparently Limpus – like Kerr – had decided that his
immediate loyalty lay with the country in whose service he was employed despite
his worries of the day before regarding German encroachment. As with the British
offer though the Turks also turned down the Germans: they had their eyes on
bigger and better things. Indeed Lowther passed on a further rumour to Nicolson
on 24 April that, in addition to the ‘two’ [sic] Brazilian dreadnoughts,
the Turks were also negotiating to buy five French destroyers — ‘No folly seems
to be too great for these poor Turks’, Lowther noted.
Again, in May, Grey was informed that the idea ‘has become prevalent in Turkish
circles that Turkey must henceforth devote her energies and expense to reform
her navy and become a Naval Power.’ One of the ideas underlying the attempt to
purchase foreign ships, Lowther continued, ‘would seem to be that by the
acquisition of such units Turkey might influence in her favour the solution of
the question of the Aegean Islands, and in any case have after peace a navy
superior to that of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, if not to that of
Russia in the Black Sea.’
In June it was reported that Turkey was
attempting to purchase Goeben; in October it was two Italian cruisers;
but the great prize remained Rio de Janeiro. Brazil had received
pre-emptive offers for the ship from Russia and Italy as well as Turkey but the
first intimation that the ship would actually be put on the open market came on
4 September in a cable from the British Minister in Brazil. The Admiralty
quickly disinterested itself in the fate of the ship which was haughtily
declared ‘unsuitable for the British Navy’ so that, when Limpus reported Turkish
fears that the Greeks might buy the ship, his suggestion that Britain herself
buy the vessel, to take it out of circulation, was promptly turned down.
Similarly, in November, when the Admiralty received information that Italy had
asked for a 10 days option to purchase, the Board decided that they ‘were not
aware of any circumstances which would justify them in purchasing the ship in
order that it might not come into the possession of the Italian Government.’
Yet the following day the Admiralty confusingly admitted to the French Naval
Attaché that the Italian purchase would upset the present balance in the
Mediterranean. Also, it was now thought the Russians did not want the ship, and
the Greeks could not afford it.
The news caused consternation in Paris when it was realized that the addition of
such a powerful unit to the Italian navy could jeopardize French plans for the
transport of the Algerian Army Corps and, in a deft attempt to resolve the
matter in their favour, it was proposed that the French loan to Greece, then
being negotiated, could be increased to cover the cost of purchasing the ship —
but this would take time.
On 22 November 1913 the Foreign Office
informed Churchill and Battenberg that the French would find the money to enable
the Greeks to buy the ship but that the builders – Armstrong’s – were on the
point of completing the sale to Italy and should be warned to delay completion.
Although Grey would have preferred Greece to have the ship, he left the final
decision to the Admiralty.
Churchill needed no prompting: he telephoned a message the next day (a Sunday!)
to inform Battenberg that the Foreign Office ‘should be told Admiralty regard it
as most important Greece should purchase. Firm should be warned at once not to
conclude alternative bargain.’
Admiralty strictures notwithstanding, information emanating from Brazil in
December indicated that a firm offer had been made by an unknown Power of a £1¼
million down payment and £940,000 in instalments,
although the Brazilian Government was still disingenuously denying any knowledge
as to the identity of the mysterious purchaser.
Grey, at least, should have been alerted when Louis Mallet, now the Ambassador
in Constantinople after Lowther’s recall, reported on 13 December that the
Turkish Ambassador in London had been authorized to negotiate the purchase of
the ship on the basis of £1 million down and the remainder in instalments,
but almost before Grey had had a chance to come to the conclusion warranted by
this information confirmation was received in a simple message from the British
Minister in Brazil on the 15th: ‘Turkey is the purchaser.’
A French bank had – somewhat undiplomatically
– loaned the Turks the money, the bank’s discomfort eased by a usurious rate of
interest. Accusations were soon being bandied about: the Greeks blamed the
French who suspected in turn that the Greeks were using the fate of the
dreadnought to extract better terms for their own loan.
The point was not lost, however, that Armstrong’s had recently obtained the
concession to reorganize the Ottoman dockyards leading to speculation that
Rio de Janeiro, now re-named Sultan Osman I, formed part of the deal.
Negotiations for the dockyard contract had been in progress from September until
3 December when Limpus was able to announce finally to Churchill their
successful conclusion, in Armstrong’s favour.
Worse news was to follow for the Greeks when, early in 1914, Turkey ordered a
third super-dreadnought. Meanwhile, the original ship from the 1911 contract –
Reschad V, now re-named Reshadieh – had been launched on 3
September 1913 by the daughter of the Turkish Ambassador with a bottle of rose
water instead of the customary champagne. This ship, along with Sultan Osman,
would be completed by the summer of 1914 whereas the Greek battle cruiser
Salamis, building at Hamburg, could not possibly be ready till the following
year (the Germans had a perfect excuse in that the Greek Ministry of Marine had
ordered American guns which would not be delivered until 1915). To make amends,
the delivery of six torpedo boats was, however, expedited in part compensation
and the flotilla sailed for Athens in January 1914. Venizelos attempted to put a
brave face on matters, assuring the Greek Chamber that, despite the Turkish
purchase of Sultan Osman, ‘Greece would remain mistress of the Aegean.’
Just in case, though, the Greek Minister of Marine was instructed to inquire as
to whether the French could supply a dreadnought similar in concept to
Salamis.
The rumours began to fly again: that the
Greeks were attempting to buy two battleships from a foreign fleet, ‘possibly
Germany’; or else one of the Argentine ships building in the United States. The
New York Shipbuilding Company, then building Moreno for Argentina, had in
fact approached the Greeks with an offer of three obsolete American
pre-dreadnoughts if the Greeks would order a super-dreadnought from them.
Before his meeting with Grey in January 1914 Venizelos had been in Paris where
the French pressed him to place an order, before leaving for London, for a
dreadnought, four destroyers and four submarines; the Prime Minister replied
that he needed the ships now, not years hence, but, nevertheless, if he could
not find a ready made battleship he would order a French one. The French were to
be similarly disappointed when they learned on 15 January of the departure from
Athens of a British naval engineer on a secret mission to England supposedly to
order a projected pair of scout cruisers and four destroyers for the Greeks.
Although the French Schneider submarines, already in Greek service, had trialled
satisfactorily Admiral Kerr was strongly pressing the claims of the British
design, while King Constantine favoured Krupps.
The French looked like being further disappointed except that they had, of
course, a crucial weapon in the form of the Greek loan. The director of Greek
naval construction, Léondopoulos, approached the French firm Penhoët about the
possibility of producing a derivative of Salamis whereupon Penhoët
countered with an attractive offer — an exact copy of the dreadnought
Lorraine they were currently building for the French navy.
But all this would take time – the one
commodity above all that the Greeks lacked – so that, unless some other event
intervened, the game would be up for them in the summer when Turkey took
possession of her two dreadnoughts. Léondopoulos was then ordered to the United
States in pursuit of one of the pair of battleships building for Argentina
though this assignment was aborted after reports filtered through of serious
problems with the turbines of the new ships. Meanwhile, the French continued to
apply pressure until, finally and in desperation, at the end of March 1914,
Venizelos relented and agreed to order the Lorraine copy.
Admiral Kerr had no weapon in his armoury with which to counter the Greek loan —
indeed, the success of the French left him in invidious position as he had
already advocated British ‘E’ class submarines only to see the Greeks purchase
French Schneiders; similarly, his preference for Babcock and Wilcox was ignored.
And now, a far greater blow, against his oft-stated dictum on the uselessness of
capital ships in the Aegean, a French dreadnought had been ordered in addition
to the German battle cruiser. This also ran counter to the two striking
achievements of the Greek navy (both occurring before Kerr’s arrival) which
pointed the way to the future: the first use of an aircraft in naval warfare and
the first submarine torpedo attack of the twentieth century.
Although, in fact, both attacks failed this did not detract from the message
taken up so enthusiastically by Kerr that Greek strategy should be based on such
forms of attack; it is doubtful, however, if anything would have caused Venizelos
to deviate from his quest for battleships.
In the spring of 1914 war between Greece and Turkey appeared
certain. The Turkish Minister of Marine, Djemal Pasha, with his usual bravado
undiluted by the precarious circumstances, was confident in May that the Turkish
fleet could defeat the Greeks without the assistance of the new
dreadnoughts. Besides, he added in a fatalistic aside to the British Ambassador,
if Turkey ‘were defeated [she] lost nothing but what had already gone, namely
the islands.’
Djemal further confided in Mallet that the Turks had another weapon, to be used
as a last resort — the expulsion of all Greeks from the Empire. At the same time
Mallet wrote privately to Grey passing on the report of Captain Boyle, the
British Naval Attaché to Greece and Turkey, who had just arrived from Athens to
present Mallet an ‘alarming account’ of the feeling in the Greek navy. Everyone
was talking ‘of war as inevitable in the near future and that even if the Greek
Government did not officially approve it might be difficult to prevent the Navy
taking the matter into their own hands and sinking the Sultan Osman and
Reshadieh on their way out.’
To forestall such an attack the Russian Ambassador helpfully inquired whether
the ships could not ‘come out under the English flag.’
Despite the threat of impending war in the
Balkans, Mallet was still anxious to return home on leave. Grey could see no
objection: ‘indeed’, he incautiously informed the Ambassador, ‘it would be a
good thing to get your leave over before the day when things may become acute
between Turkey and Greece.’
Mallet would eventually depart early in July. Not to be outdone, the British
Minister in Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, also travelled home on leave at the end
of May. Therefore, for the critical period in the disturbed summer of 1914, the
legation in Athens and embassy in Constantinople would both be in the hands of
Chargés d’Affaires: William Erskine and Henry Beaumont respectively.
As the time expired before the arrival of
Sultan Osman and Reshadieh, the Greeks redoubled their efforts to
obtain ships ‘off the peg’: an approach to Japan to sell the British-built
battle cruiser Kongo was politely but unsurprisingly rebuffed; however,
China did agree to the sale of a small cruiser about to be completed in the
United States, but whose presence in the Aegean by the end of June, while
welcome, could not compensate for the arrival of the Turkish battleships, due
shortly after. Despite the earlier abortive mission it was, in fact, in America
that the breakthrough was made. The U. S. Navy was anxious to dispose of two
relatively recent capital ships – Idaho and Mississippi – which
had been completed in 1908 but still ranked as pre-dreadnoughts. Although fêted
at the time of their building as amongst the latest and most powerful weapons of
mass destruction in reality they were too slow, too small, and with too low a
freeboard. On 28 May 1914 Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels appeared before
a Senate Committee to recommend acceptance of the amendment that the ships be
sold. The amendment passed easily: American vital interests were not being
affected and the Navy would do well out of the deal — Greece was getting no
bargain. The debate then moved to the House of Representatives while the Greek
Government, ‘unable to comprehend the tortuous procedures of a liberal
democracy, fretted at the delay.’
The newly arrived Turkish Ambassador in
Washington was, to his surprise, informed by President Wilson that the ships
were wanted by Greece for ‘peaceful purposes’ by making the Greek navy too
strong to be attacked by the Turkish fleet. The Ambassador riposted that the
presence of the ships would add to the imbalance of power, for, while she had
them, the Greek navy would be the stronger; however, the Turkish navy would soon
be in possession of two vastly superior super-dreadnoughts and so would then
have the initiative. The pressure would be increased on Greece, therefore, to
launch a pre-emptive attack. In desperation the Turks offered more for the ships
in spite of the fact that, when the House debated the matter again on 23 June,
it was made plain just what a liability they were. According to the New York
Times, ‘In the ordinary course, the ships would be consigned to the scrap
heap, or be used as targets.’
Although, incredibly, there was still some opposition to this one-sided deal,
the Naval Appropriation Bill duly passed by 174 votes to 87; Greece would pay
more than the original cost of the two battleships, while the Americans could
now afford to build a new super-dreadnought with the proceeds.
Admiral Kerr, ignored in Athens, could only
describe Venizelos as ‘penny-wise and pound foolish’ as the latest additions to
the Greek navy were ‘two old battleships whose guns and engines were worn out,
and which were entirely useless for war.’ The deal, concluded behind his back,
‘ruined the progress of the Greek navy for the rest of the time I was there, and
afterwards.’
Kerr’s discomfiture would not have been eased had he been aware of the First
Lord’s reaction — Churchill made his feelings quite clear to Battenberg and the
Admiralty secretary, Sir William Graham Greene on 4 June:
I am greatly concerned at the report in the Foreign Office
telegram attached of the proposed purchase by Greece of two of the United States
battleships of approximately the Formidable class. An offer like this, if
made to us, would enable an enormous improvement in our material to be effected
without additional cost. Our strength in older battleships is far beyond what we
require. It is incredible that our Naval Mission can have let the Greeks go to
the United States without, at any rate, giving us the option…
The threat of a Turco-Greek war was now
acute. In Constantinople the British Embassy had decamped from its commanding
position atop the hill overlooking the Golden Horn in hot, unhealthy Pera to the
more congenial Therapia on the shores of the Bosphorus. When, late on the
afternoon of 19 June, the Embassy Dragoman, Andrew Ryan, returned to the
deserted building in Pera, intending to sleep there, he found the ‘danger signs
so ominous’ that he hurried back that evening to inform Mallet, who was due to
go on leave on 6 July; the most Mallet would do was to delay his departure about
a week.
Short of war itself, Grey’s primary concern was that the Turks would close the
Straits to shipping. His apparent insouciance in the matter of Mallet’s leave
was in part explained by the information he had received that the Turkish army
could not move through Thrace to attack Greece by land: the army was in no fit
state for such an expedition and there was also the small problem of violating
Bulgarian territory while, at sea, Greece was already in possession of the
islands and the Turkish fleet was unlikely to emerge from the shelter of the
Dardanelles. If Britain intervened at all, Grey argued, ‘it would be to keep the
Straits open, because any closing of the Straits caused no end of trouble and
loss to British shipping.’ In discussion with the French and Russian
Ambassadors, Grey’s opinion was that warships might be sent to the mouth of the
Straits as a guarantee that if Turkey kept them open for merchant shipping no
Greek warship would be allowed to go through. ‘On the other hand’, he added,
it would be necessary to prevent Turkish warships from coming
out; but we could hardly take a measure of that kind unless Turkey had first, by
closing the Straits, shown that she did not intend her own fleet to come out and
fight. In that event, we should be justified in saying to her that, as she
clearly did not mean her own fleet to come out, she could lose nothing by
opening the Straits with a guarantee from us that Greek warships would not be
allowed to enter to attack her.
Grey warned Mallet the following day, 16 June, of his fears
regarding a closure but had to admit that a proposal to Turkey along those lines
would be ‘premature’. At the same time Erskine was reporting from Athens that
war ‘is commonly regarded here as a matter of days’. Although the simmering
state of the islands’ question had been exacerbated by reports of the
ill-treatment of Greek subjects by Turks, the root cause of the current alarm
remained the rapidly approaching date for the delivery of the Turkish
battleships. As a bonus for the Greeks, one of the newly purchased American
ships – Idaho – was fortuitously in the Mediterranean on a training
cruise and it was hoped that the ship could be manned and in Greek service by
mid-July, some weeks before Sultan Osman would be ready to sail from the
Tyne (Reshadieh would not be ready until the end of August).
Admiral Kerr meanwhile had formulated his own
ideas and submitted ‘a rather bold plan of action’ but doubted the Greek
Government would adopt it. ‘They have in other matters’, Erskine confided to
Grey, ‘repeatedly preferred to listen to the advice of ignorant Greek officers
rather than his own, and it was only with great difficulty that he induced them
recently to lay in a store of ammunition. He says moreover that there is a
serious shortage of officers and of trained men.’
This, of course, was the crucial issue. Kerr’s ‘rival’ in Constantinople,
Admiral Limpus, had spent months raising and training a scratch crew for
Sultan Osman but by late May his time was up and five hundred ratings,
‘possessing a thin veneer of knowledge of their specialized trades…were packed
into the transport Neshid Pasha at Constantinople and cheered off down
the Hellespont.’
The steamer finally arrived at Armstrong’s yard, Newcastle-on-Tyne, on 27 July.
It is difficult to imagine, if the greater
conflict had not intervened, what would have been the outcome of the match
between the new Turkish super-dreadnoughts and the older Greek battleships,
supported by a couple of modern cruisers. If it is accepted that, following the
evidence of the Balkan Wars, the Greek ships were more ably manned, could this
alone have offset the huge Turkish materiel advantage? Venizelos was in no such
doubt: he confidently predicted that the acquisition of Idaho and
Mississippi would ensure peace and, not to be outdone by Djemal Pasha, went
so far as to declare that their presence would give Greece naval superiority
even after the delivery of the second Turkish dreadnought. Of course he
did add that while this would avert the danger of Greece provoking war , it
would also ‘undoubtedly render her indisposed to make any concessions over the
islands.’
But Venizelos’ little bluff fooled no-one: two days earlier, Erskine had been
reporting that the Greek Government and public opinion were ‘much concerned at
report that Turkish Government are pressing for immediate delivery of
Dreadnoughts, even if unfinished.’
These fears were corroborated by the Greek Minister in London, Gennadius, who
saw Grey on 24 June with ‘circumstantial details’ which left Grey under the
impression that ‘the two ships will not be complete but they will be in fighting
condition though still short of a gun or two and will be handed over to the
Turks at the beginning of August.’
Missing guns or not, Venizelos could not afford to take chances.
At which point Dr E. J. Dillon entered the
scene, following a path trod by the likes of Bourchier. Dillon was an
Anglo-Irish journalist and sometime foreign affairs commentator for the Daily
Telegraph; the 60-year-old writer and linguist had covered such events as
the Dreyfus Trial and Boxer Rebellion for the Telegraph and, no doubt,
his well-meant copy would again make good reading no matter how unlikely the
proposal he carried with him. Dillon had been handed a Treaty of Peace and
Reciprocal Protection which had been drawn up by the Greek Foreign Ministry
and covered the question of the islands and other outstanding differences with
Turkey.
Dillon met Talaat Pasha, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, on 13 July 1914
to put to him the Greek offer of a defensive treaty — Venizelos would meet a
Turkish plenipotentiary at a neutral site to discuss a defensive alliance and an
agreement that the disputed islands become autonomous, under Turkish suzerainty,
but with a Greek governor-general. In Constantinople there was no rush of
candidates to meet the wily Greek politician and, almost by elimination, the
Grand Vizier drew the short straw; the venue would be Brussels.
News of the proposed meeting drew a self-satisfied response from Grey:
Their respective purchases of Dreadnoughts to overawe each
other will be money wasted after a defensive Treaty has been made. When that is
signed they had better agree to sell their Dreadnoughts, unless they are
ambitious enough to attempt together to control Italy.
On the same day that Dillon met Talaat, the timorous German
Minister to Greece, Count von Quadt, was sent back to Athens from Berlin with
‘propositions of the greatest importance’ — which possibly involved a bribe to
Greece in the form of concessions at the expense of Serbia. Nevertheless, the
German hope that Greece would join the Triple Alliance as a result of these
‘propositions’ was to be unfulfilled.
Wilhelm, undeterred, continued to play a lone hand. At the German Foreign Office,
however, the response to the surprise announcement was characterized by Jagow who
thought the conclusion of an alliance ‘very dubious’ and who would have
preferred an arrangement on the basis of neutrality.
The Grand Vizier was, understandably,
hesitant in nominating a date for his departure: that he considered his journey
would be wasted was evident when he declared to the Austrian Ambassador on 23
July, ‘in the most definite manner’, that he would agree to no alliance with M
Venizelos.
Undeterred, Venizelos started out for Brussels anyway. ‘I gather’, Erskine
reported from Athens on 25 July,
that in view of the vacillating attitude of the Ottoman
Government and of the evident reluctance of the Grand Vizier to fix the date of
his departure, M Venizelos is less sanguine now than he was recently as to the
result of the meeting, assuming that it takes place. His principal reason for
starting at once without waiting for the Grand Vizier seems to have been his
desire to show that the Greek Government on their side had done everything
possible to bring about a peaceful settlement. His need of a holiday and the
good excuse afforded by his absence for the continued adjournment of the Chamber
have also no doubt influenced his decision.
Rather than travel all the way, fruitlessly,
to Brussels, Venizelos’ intention was to ‘wait in the neighbourhood of Munich’
until he was certain that the Grand Vizier had left for Brussels.
In fulfilment of this plan the Greek Premier had reached Trieste by 24 July
where he learnt of the Austrian ultimatum the previous day to Serbia. This would
not have improved his temper as he knew that article 1 of the Military
Convention between Greece and Serbia of 21 June 1913 bound either side to come
to the assistance of the other if attacked by a third party — ‘Greece with all
her land and sea forces, Serbia with all her land forces’. Venizelos realized
that any support offered to Serbia against Austria would leave Greece open to
attack from either Bulgaria or Turkey. Conveniently, his absence from Athens
provided a handy excuse to postpone ‘any immediate reply in the event of
Serbia’s asking for the application or our alliance.’
By the next day Venizelos had reached Munich on his odyssey; in the intervening
24 hours he had also discovered a let-out to avoid the onerous burden of the
defensive alliance with Serbia. Without yet seeing the Serbian reply to the
Austrian note, Venizelos informed his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Streit, that
it was premature to enforce the terms of the alliance due to the ‘provocative’
conduct of Serbia, who would therefore have to face the Austro-Hungarian Empire
alone. The only event that would cause Venizelos to act was a Bulgarian attack.
Streit, who entertained pronounced German sympathies, promptly informed the
German Chargé d’Affaires that Greece would not take part in an Austro-Serbian
conflict, and Herr Bassewitz just as promptly wired Berlin.
Everything, then, depended on the attitude of
Bulgaria; however, when Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July, Bulgaria
announced her neutrality, giving Venizelos a further breathing space. As there
was little point in continuing on to Brussels Venizelos requested that the Grand
Vizier meet him in Munich instead but Said Halim was not for leaving
Constantinople and, his scheme thwarted by outside events, the Greek Premier
left Munich on 29 July to return to Athens — but not before instructing Streit
‘to encourage the Entente Powers to send a naval unit to the Aegean in order to
secure Greece’s freedom of communication.’ Venizelos feared that Greek
mobilization might provoke Austria into attempting to blockade the Gulf of
Salonica which was ‘a major supply artery for both Greece and Serbia.’
Once back in Athens, and still scheming, he suggested to the Grand Vizier that
they meet on one of the disputed islands
but by then it was too late — the Turco-German alliance was on the point of
being signed.
A fortnight earlier, the German Ambassador at Constantinople,
Baron von Wangenheim, had been of little doubt: ‘Turkey is today’, he declared
vehemently, ‘without any question worthless as an ally. She would only be a
burden to her associates, without being able to offer them the slightest
advantage…Turkey can only be advised to keep away from every political adventure
and to maintain friendly relations with all nations.’
In talks with senior members of the Committee of Union and Progress Wangenheim
reiterated his argument that neutrality was the best option for Turkey. His
subsequent volte-face was forced by the receipt of a ‘peremptory’ order on 24
July from the Kaiser who, ‘in spite of existing doubt as to Turkey’s capacity as
an ally, is of the opinion that at the present moment, for reasons of
expediency, Turkey’s inclination towards a connection with the Triple Alliance
could be taken advantage of…’ Wangenheim was emphatically instructed to
negotiate an ad hoc arrangement, avoiding any far-reaching obligations.
The Ambassador had a valid point – that the Russo-Turkish border would always be
a weak point in a grand Berlin-Baghdad link-up – but this tactical defect was
counterbalanced in Wilhelm’s mind by the desirability of having as many allies
as possible and, not unincidentally, the incalculable advantage of being able to
close the Straits to Russian shipping. The dropping of Wangenheim’s scruples
resulted in the immediate offer of an alliance.
Wangenheim telegraphed Berlin on 28 July that
the Grand Vizier desired a secret offensive and defensive alliance with Germany
against Russia only: Turkey ‘required no protection against any other countries
than Russia.’
The Chancellor replied with alacrity that Wilhelm accepted the Grand Vizier’s
proposal and that the deal should be concluded on the basis that both Powers
observe strict neutrality in the present Austro-Serbian conflict.
Following the intervention of the All-Highest Wangenheim had diplomatically, if
cravenly, revised his opinion of Turkish arms: with German officers at its head
the military worth of the Turkish army would, he declared, be increased
‘threefold’, but his new found confidence could not offset Turkish cold feet
following the Russian mobilization on 31 July.
As Wangenheim also suspected that the Greeks might try to block the Dardanelles
to prevent the passage of the Turkish Dreadnoughts clearly the time to act was
now — however, his appeal on 1 August that Goeben be sent to reinforce the
Turkish fleet against the Russian Black Sea Fleet was rejected when Wilhelm
directed that the Ambassador be informed ‘The cruiser Goeben can not be
dispensed with at present time.’
On the evening of 1 August Wangenheim met
senior members of the C.U.P. in the Grand Vizier’s villa at Yeniköy. Minister of
War Enver hoped to present his co-conspirators with a fait accompli in respect
of the alliance, overriding the strong objections of Minister of Finance Djavid;
besides, Enver (never one to carry one revolver when two would do) had a
bombshell in his possession — a telegram from London announcing that the British
Government had embargoed the two Turkish dreadnoughts. In any case, Enver
declared, it was now too late to consider alternative courses of action as Said
Halim had already signed the alliance. This was, as Enver knew, precipitate as
Wangenheim informed Berlin that the alliance was actually signed at 4 p.m. on 2
August.
Nevertheless, confirmation of the signing brought a change of heart in Berlin
when Tirpitz requested that Constantinople be informed that Goeben and
Breslau had now been ordered at once to the Golden Horn, with the suggestion
that Souchon be placed at the disposal of the Turkish Government to command the
Turkish fleet.
It was thought that this sudden turnaround would help prevent any wavering at
the Porte, though the ploy was not immediately successful: aware at last of the
implications of his actions Said Halim now began to worry. Just as the Greeks
would do, Said looked at Bulgaria and did not like what he saw. Perhaps Said was
hopeful that Germany would settle for a benevolent neutrality of Turkey’s part,
a course which would have been jeopardized by the sudden descent of Goeben
and Breslau. In addition, the Turkish mobilization announced on 3 August
was proceeding as efficiently as one would expect — in other words, Turkey was
in no position to begin fighting.
In the circumstances Wangenheim was forced to
telegraph Berlin of the Grand Vizier’s fears regarding Bulgaria — it was this
fear which resulted in the telegram being forwarded to Souchon on the 5th by the
German Admiralty that it was not possible to put into Constantinople at present
for political reasons (Souchon received the information while at Messina on the
6th and decided to ignore it).
It is also possible that Said could have used his fears as a pretext to extract
further concessions from Germany; he was certainly not slow to exploit his
momentary ascendancy over Wangenheim and the Ambassador’s torment lasted until
the 6th when he was finally informed that the Cabinet had agreed to open the
Straits to Souchon’s squadron and any stray Austrian ships. However, as a
quid pro quo, could Wangenheim possibly pledge Germany’s acceptance of any
of the following? — German assistance in the abolition of the hated
Capitulations; a guarantee of Turkish territorial integrity; restoration of the
islands; a ‘small’ correction of Turkey’s eastern border and an appropriate war
indemnity.
As the Royal Navy was then in hot pursuit of Souchon, Wangenheim was obviously
aware – as he was meant to be – that any delay at the entrance to the
Dardanelles might result in the destruction of the German squadron. The
Ambassador accepted the proposals. Lest this action be deemed reckless, clearly
only a decisive victory by the Triple Alliance would necessitate the fulfilment
of these promises and, as there was thus considerable room to manoeuvre, the
German Foreign Office approved Wangenheim’s action.

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