Chapter
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Hyper-linked Table of Contents
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1
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Changing
fortunes
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Britain’s
strategical interest in the Mediterranean following the opening of the
Suez Canal — the French threat — the propagation of naval scares —
naval expenditure is increased — the Naval Defence Act of 1889 — the
Mediterranean debates of the 1890s — the dissipation of the French
threat — Fisher as C-in-C, Mediterranean — the necessity for economy
— Fisher is appointed First Sea Lord.
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2
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The
Fisher Factor
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The
perils of taking Fisher at face value — his inconsistency — Fisher’s
remit — the elimination of the French and Russian threats — French
policy in Morocco — Fisher’s preference for Alexandria — the
constant redistribution of the British Fleet — the Anglo-French Entente
— the first Moroccan crisis — Russia’s defeat — the naval centre
of gravity moves north — the inception of the battle cruiser — new
methods of fire control.
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3
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Bigger
Guns and Greater Speed
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The
example of the Russo-Japanese War — the importance of long-range gunnery
— the threat posed by the torpedo — real or imagined? — the tactical
advantage of speed — finding a suitable rôle for the battle cruiser —
the German response to the new class — renewed calls for economy — the
Mediterranean fleet is halved.
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4
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Foreign
Entanglements
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The
threat from Germany — the Committee of Imperial Defence — its objects
— Admiralty hegemony — the formulation of War Plans to assist the
French — the Navy’s plan is found wanting — a change of Government
— an innocent discussion group — a fortuitous meeting while riding —
the military correspondent of The Times — the Army view prevails — an
interview with the French Ambassador — the ‘great question’ — Sir
Edward Grey authorizes Anglo-French Staff Talks — Cabinet debate is
denied — who knew what and when? — the influence of the
Under-Secretary — a sanguine appraisal — Fisher rejects the military
strategy — the moral force created by the Entente —a bribe for
Germany? — the heckling of the French Senator — the awkward question.
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5
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Plans
of War
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Fisher
attempts to quell his critics — the subsequent naval War Plans —
Beresford finds fault — the War Plans controversy continues — the
clamour for a Naval War Staff — the threat of war in 1908 — the
Invasion Sub-Committee — Fisher’s unexpected reaction — the
Tweedmouth letter — the international situation — Anglo-French naval
talks — the “three conventions” — the French reaction — the
entrenchment of the Continental Strategy — the great naval scare of 1909
and its aftermath.
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6
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A
New Enemy
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The
Mediterranean naval race and its implications — French reactions — the
great Fisher-Beresford feud — an Asquithian compromise — agitation for
a Naval War Staff increases — Fisher’s tenure ends — Admiral Wilson
is appointed First Sea Lord — his faults — the Anglo-Russian entente
— Empire or encirclement? — the Straits question — a difficult year
in the life of the Liberal Government — the resumption of Anglo-German
naval conversations.
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7
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Agadir
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The
origins of the crisis — the British position in the Mediterranean —
Churchill enters the debate — Admiral Wilson is unconcerned — the
conciliatory approach of Grey — the subsequent flare-up — Lloyd George
speaks his mind — were British interests affected? — the German
Ambassador’s fury — tension eases — the Continental commitment
outlined — Haldane’s secret initiative — the C. I. D. pronounces on
strategy — Admiral Wilson’s lamentable performance — the inept naval
alternative.
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8
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The
Right of Free Choice
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Asquith
determines on changes at the Admiralty — Haldane’s longing for the
position — a second suitor — the ramifications of Admiral Wilson’s
performance — Anglo-French naval talks are re-activated — increasing
French confidence — the French centre of gravity moves south — the
mania for secrecy — Asquith’s concern— the militarization of the
“Terrible Twins” — policy is dictated by considerations of strategy
— fear of French military weakness and the position of Belgium —
Churchill stakes his claim for the Admiralty — the influence of Henry
Wilson — the Radicals fight back — all change at the Admiralty — a
confrontation in the Cabinet.
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9
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Churchill
Arrives
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The
revivification of Fisher — the formation of a Naval War Staff — its
defects — Churchill determines on a new First Sea Lord — the Turco-Italian
War — Fisher and Alexandria once more — Churchill’s renewed interest
in the Mediterranean naval situation — a French rebuff —
Battenberg’s unease — the finalization of the Naval War Staff — the
German novelle — Churchill’s attempt to bypass the Committee of
Imperial Defence — the plan to withdraw the Mediterranean battleships.
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10
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“We
cannot have everything or be strong everywhere”
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The
Haldane mission — proposals and counter-proposals — Churchill’s
unhelpful intervention — the Anglo-German talks fail — French
suspicion — the Mediterranean to be evacuated — the Naval Holiday —
the proposed recasting of the fleet — the Foreign Office becomes
involved — Sir Arthur Nicolson is let in on a secret — an alliance
with France? — the War Office reaction.
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11
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The
Malta Compromise
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A
small victory for the Cabinet — the summer cruise of Asquith and
Churchill — Admiral Beatty’s idea — the Malta meetings — Churchill
overcomes Kitchener — Kitchener enlists Grey’s help — Churchill
tries to overcome the Cabinet — a job for the battle cruisers —
McKenna fights back — the question of figures — who was right? —
Churchill marshals his support — Sir Arthur Nicolson’s cold feet.
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12
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The
Numbers Game
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The
C.I.D. sits in judgment — a loose compromise — Esher is elated,
Churchill deflated — a trap for the Canadians — the Canadians escape
— the dispositions for the Mediterranean are set — the pliable
Admiralty — the Franco-Russian Naval Convention — Churchill’s new
initiative — the private and public stances of the Admiralty — formal
Anglo-French conversations.
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13
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The
Obligation
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The
Austrian enigma — Poincaré spins a web — Churchill holds out for
freedom of action — the problem of finding a successor to Admiral
Troubridge — the French move their battleships from Brest — the
relentless French pressure — Italian machinations — complications in
the Mediterranean — the Grey-Cambon letters — the question of command
— naval reaction to the First Balkan War — Bridgeman is outmanoeuvred
— Battenberg fulfils an ambition.
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14
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The
Polarization of the Mediterranean
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A
lack of resources — the Algerian Corps in French plans — the first
British battle cruiser arrives — the completion of the technical
Anglo-French arrangement — Battenberg’s cloak and dagger —
Mediterranean War Orders — Admiral Milne’s friendly advice —
Churchill’s Mediterranean diversions — the Adriatic position — the
renewal of the Triple Alliance Naval Convention — the questionable naval
co-operation of Italy and Austria-Hungary — a British naval
demonstration is required — Beatty wants his ships back —
Churchill’s estrangement from the C.I.D. — flaws in the Naval War
Staff — Italian duplicity — Grey does not rise to the bait — San
Giuliano cries “wolf”.
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15
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Naval
Estimates and the Question of Substitution
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Churchill
and the policy of Dreadnought substitution — the storm over the 1914-15
Estimates — Lloyd George speaks his mind again — his estrangement from
Churchill — the Canadian dreadnoughts fail to make up the shortfall —
Churchill’s flexible Mediterranean policy — Asquith intervenes —
Lloyd George compromises — the submarine question — the future for
Dreadnoughts.
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16
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The
Limitations of Foreign Policy
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Faulty
intelligence — Churchill redeems his pledge — the question of
substitution once more — a source on ready-made Dreadnoughts — the
evolution of tactics — French strength — the French attempt to cement
the bond — an initial lack of co-operation — Milne to be responsible
for Goeben — Sazonov renews his approach — Britain’s hand is forced
— preliminary Anglo-Russian talks are instigated — a diplomatic leak
— Grey is discomfited — German knowledge of the talks.
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17
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“Before
the unknown”
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The
British pledge to France and its implications — the onset of the crisis
— Ulster dominates — the growing awareness — Grey’s proposal for a
Conference — localizing the conflict — the question of Belgian
neutrality — the Cabinet hedges its bets — the Continent mobilizes —
a shameless German proposal — the naval situation — Churchill
pre-empts the Cabinet — the embargo of the Turkish Dreadnoughts.
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18
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“Mon
petit papier”
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Grey’s
‘painful’ interview with the French Ambassador — the position of the
permanent officials at the Foreign Office — Churchill’s intrigue —
Cambon’s allegation — Saturday’s Cabinet and Grey’s unusual
initiative — a misunderstanding — Grey’s threat to go — Lloyd
George refuses to take the Radical whip — the issue of Belgian
neutrality becomes paramount — Cambon goes on the attack — the outcome
of the embargo — Grey’s ‘fixation’ with the English Channel —
German naval operational plans — the future of the Liberal Party.
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19
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The
Decision for War
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The
unprecedented Sunday Cabinet — Grey argues for a pledge to France —
the Cabinet is split — the conversion of the middle section—
Asquith’s reasoning — Grey controls the agenda — Italian neutrality
and the Mediterranean position — Grey’s pledge to Cambon — the
problem of Goeben and Breslau and the French troop transportation — the
‘excuse’ of Belgium— Samuel’s exaggerated rôle — the cynical
policy of Lloyd George.
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20
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“A
terrible business”
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Cabinet
resignations — the army is neglected — an emotional scene in the
Cabinet — Grey prepares for his speech — the atmosphere in the House
— Grey rises to speak — his lengthy defence of his policy — Grey
carries the House — loud and prolonged cheers — Churchill’s
immediate reaction — the question of Cabinet unity — Goeben and
Breslau are sighted — Churchill is restrained — the moral force of the
Grey-Cambon letters — Grey’s responsibility.
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21
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Summary
and conclusions
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Bibliography
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Index
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